



Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

Theses and Dissertations

Thesis Collection

1999-06

The military and nation building : a comparative study of the Nigerian and the South African military as instruments of national integration

Nkomo, Pax D. T.

Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School



Calhoun is a project of the Dudley Knox Library at NPS, furthering the precepts and goals of open government and government transparency. All information contained herein has been approved for release by the NPS Public Affairs Officer.

**Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle
Monterey, California USA 93943**

<http://www.nps.edu/library>

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**THE MILITARY AND NATION BUILDING: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE NIGERIAN AND THE
SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY AS INSTRUMENTS OF
NATIONAL INTEGRATION**

by
Pax D. T. Nkomo

June 1999

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Letitia Lawson
Mary Callahan

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

19990921 067

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)

2. REPORT DATE
June 1999

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

THE MILITARY AND NATION BUILDING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE NIGERIAN AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY AS INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)

Nkomo, Pax D. T.

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government, any other government or military.

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) After forty years of independence, African countries are still battling with the problem of nation building. This thesis examines the possibility of the military playing a direct role in ethnic integration. The variables, which may determine the military's ability to affect national integration, are the political elite, the state and society. It is found that at lower levels of development, these variables do not support the military in the direction of national integration but they do so at higher levels of development. The issue that arises from this finding is whether African countries should wait for development to occur in the hope that it will bring national integration with it. On the other hand, lack of integration causes mistrust, tensions and conflicts, which weaken the thrust to development. African countries should therefore find methods of political organization that reduce such tensions and conflicts in order to facilitate development and consequently national integration. It is this need for stability that the culturally adaptive mode of political organization is recommended for African countries.

14. SUBJECT TERMS

Elite-Mass Gap, Cultural Displacement, Cultural Adaptation, School of the Nation Theory, Elite Security Maps, Civil Military Boundaries, Level of Socio- economic Development

15. NUMBER OF PAGES
124

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT

Unclassified

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT

Unclassified

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

UL

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**THE MILITARY AND NATION BUILDING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
NIGERIAN AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY AS INSTRUMENTS OF
NATIONAL INTEGRATION**

Pax D. T. Nkomo
Wing Commander, Airforce of Zimbabwe
B. B. S., University of Zimbabwe, 1988
M.B.A., University of Zimbabwe, 1998

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS**

from the


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

June 1999


Author:


Pax D. T. Nkomo

Approved by:


Letitia Lawson, Thesis Advisor


Mary O'Leary, Second Reader


Frank C. Petho, Chairman
Department of National Security
Affairs

ABSTRACT

After forty years of independence, African countries are still battling with the problem of nation building. There is widespread political instability and caused by ethnic conflicts. This thesis examines the possibility of the military playing a direct role in ethnic integration. The variables, which may determine the military's ability to effect national integration, are the political elite, the state and society. It is found that at lower levels of development, these variables do not support the military in the direction of national integration but they do so at higher levels of development. The issue which arises from this finding is whether African countries should wait for the level of development to eventually rise in the hope that it will bring national integration with it. They can not wait because without some form of consensus within countries, mistrust tensions and conflicts will weaken the thrust to development, which is the necessary ingredient for national integration. African countries should therefore find methods of political organization, which reduce such tensions and conflicts in order to facilitate development and consequently achieve national integration. It is this need for stability that the culturally adaptive mode of political organization is recommended for African countries.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION.....	1
A. INTRODUCTION.....	1
B. THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION.....	4
1. <i>The Concept of Nation</i>	4
2. <i>Modernization Theory</i>	6
3. <i>Primordial Theory</i>	10
4. <i>Integrated Theory</i>	11
5. <i>Cultural Displacement or Cultural Adaptation?</i>	14
6. <i>State Society Relations</i>	17
C. THE MILITARY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION.....	20
1. <i>The Theory of the School of the Nation</i>	21
2. <i>The Concept of "Ethnic-security Maps"</i>	24
3. <i>Effect of Level of Development</i>	28
D. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY.....	30
E. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE.....	31
1. <i>Military and Society</i>	32
2. <i>Military and Political Elite</i>	32
3. <i>Military and State</i>	33
4. <i>Level of Social Modernization</i>	34
5. <i>Case Selection</i>	36
II. THE NIGERIAN MILITARY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION (1960-1966)39	
A. INTRODUCTION.....	39
B. THE EFFECT OF THE ELITE.....	40
C. THE EFFECT OF THE STATE.....	49
D. THE EFFECT OF THE SOCIETY.....	54
E. CONCLUSION.....	62
III. THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION.....	65
A. INTRODUCTION.....	65
B. THE EFFECT OF THE ELITE.....	67
C. THE EFFECT OF THE STATE.....	74
D. THE EFFECT OF THE SOCIETY.....	78
1. <i>Elimination of Peasants</i>	78
2. <i>KwaZulu-Natal</i>	80
3. <i>Afrikaner Ethnic Group</i>	82
E. CONCLUSION.....	85
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS.....	89
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS.....	89
1. <i>The Political Elite</i>	89
2. <i>Effect of the State</i>	90
3. <i>Effect of Society</i>	92
B. CONCLUSION.....	94
LIST OF REFERENCES.....	101
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	105

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	109
---------------------------------	-----

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Level of Cross-ethnic Voting for Nigerian General Election (1959)	43
Table 2: Socio-economic Data of Nigeria (1965)	58
Table 3: Cross-ethnic Voting in the South African Election of 1994	69
Table 4: Factor Analysis: Elite Attitudes Toward Civic and Public Organizations.....	71
Table 5: Patterns of Labor Migration from Transkei, 1893-1916.....	79
Table 6: Socio-economic data for South Africa in 1994.....	85
Table 7: Comparison of Level of Cross-voting.....	89
Table 8: Comparison of Socio-Economic Data.....	93

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis is about whether the military can be an instrument of national integration in an ethnically divided society. If the military were to be such an instrument, it would have to be internally integrated so that it can influence society in the direction of national integration. Given its position in the state, the military's ability to accomplish this task will depend on the behavior of the political elite, the state and the society. The evidence shows that the level of development of the above mentioned variables is important for the out come of such a task. When a country is at a low level of development, the political elite utilizes ethnicity for political survival. This elite wants to change the composition of the military to reflect its conceptualization of the security of its ethnic group. The state and its institutions including the military are too weak to protect their corporate interests and independently influence society. The political behavior of society is influenced by patron client linkages, which cause more suspicion between the ethnic groups. These patterns of behavior by the elite, the state and the society are not observed at higher levels of development.

For an institution like the military to succeed as an instrument of national integration, a higher level of socio-economic transformation should have taken place. A question arises as to the role of institutions such as the military in national integration at a high level of socio economic development. Since at that level, socio-economic transformation would have created horizontal and vertical linkages which are inherently integrative it may look as though institutions do not have much to do. The finding that

institutions are very effective in national integration at high level of development should make them effective in integrating previously neglected groups and minorities. The developed structures should make it easier to do this.

The conclusion is that the military can be an instrument of national integration depending upon the level of socio-economic development of the country. Such a conclusion does not mean very much since the ethnic tensions, which are common within African states, are blocking efforts to socio-economic development. The immediate requirement is a type of national organization, which reduces suspicion and tensions in African polities so that an environment, which creates conditions for development, may exist. There should be an alternative form of organization which removes the mistrust by those ethnic groups without political power who feel that those in power want to dominate culturally and economically. Nation building through the model of cultural displacement in underdeveloped countries created high levels of mistrust and tension. It is possible that the high values of the military could still be useful for national integration at low levels of development if a different form of organization with more trust is followed. Looking at the problem from this perspective, one can vision the military being effective at all levels of socio- economic development.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I dedicate this work to the Zimbabwe the Ministry of Defense.

I would like to thank the professors in the National Security Affairs Department, fellow students in the 1998 civil-military class who in their various capacities rendered to me the much-required assistance. Much appreciation goes to Patrick Bolger, from the Monterey Institute of International Relations for conscientiously reading and correcting the scripts. My special thanks go to Professor Letitia Lawson who guided my work and to Professor Mary Callahan for providing very thoughtful insights to clarify my arguments. Many thanks go to Professor Thomas Bruneau for his encouragement at the most critical of times in the production of this work.

I. ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION

A. INTRODUCTION

When colonialism in Africa collapsed beginning with the independence of Ghana in 1957, it was clear that the new nations would begin a long journey of nation building. As each country assumed independence, there were confident calls for national unity in the independence speeches. Forty years have passed, and a lot of blood has been spilt in north, south, west and central Africa over ethnicity related issues.

The lack of nationally unifying principles has manifested itself in several ways. First, there arose disagreements between the elite over the direction of political change such as the division of power between the center and the regions. This issue has caused civil wars in Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia and Nigeria. Second, each time a political leader has a political base by which he claims leadership to the whole country, that base is ethnic in character. Third, in some African countries, regional elites and the traditional leadership have cooperated in their claims of supremacy over the whole national polity. In Nigeria for example, the traditional leadership in the north of the country successfully incorporated the new elite in the Northern Peoples Congress to create a bureaucracy that they employed as a bulwark for control of the federation.¹ In other parts of Africa too, national unity policies were centered on the distribution of posts in the bureaucracy following the ethnic distribution of state power. These policies made it easier for the

¹ Larry Diamond, Class, *Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 301.

opposition to mobilize around the neglected ethnic groups. It could be argued that disagreements over these issues led to one party states, dictatorships and ethnic cliques whose political practices were a mere supplant of the previous colonial governors and their bureaucracies. In these cases they represented a form of internal colonialism.

Osei-Kwame notes that there is opposition to this internal colonialism by the rising middle class of young and upcoming intellectuals, professionals, students and workers who show that they are prepared to fight for a new independence.² The Movement for Multi-party Democracy in Zambia came on such a platform when it won elections in 1991. The current pro-democracy movement in Nigeria and various constitutional conferences in other parts of Africa also indicate this trend. These events show that ethnicity is an important consideration in the nation building efforts of the African state, and yet a successful model for national integration has not been found. The policy choice is whether to ignore cultural differences hoping that they will cease to be consequential, or to find some common ground on which the different ethnic groups can integrate.

The post colonial period has seen the military being involved in the problems of national integration either in their security role or in a political role during those times when they are controlling the state. In either capacity, the military is an instrument that possesses a unique culture of camaraderie and patriotic values that enable it to have superior organization. The military organization is therefore capable of exercising

² Peter Osei-Kwame, *A New Conceptual Model for the Study of Political Integration in Africa* (Washington: University Press of America, 1980), 29.

bureaucratic impartiality more successfully than civilian organizations. Bureaucratic impartiality causes ethnic related tensions to be fewer in the military. Realizing this superior organization, some scholars have argued that the military could be utilized as an instrument of national integration.³ This study will establish the factors that may determine the success or failure of the military as an instrument of national integration by comparing the Nigerian and the South African military. It is important to stress that neither of the two militaries had made it official policy to be instruments of national integration. However, the manner in which both militaries approached ethnic issues indicated that there was an implied policy directed towards their role in national integration. This had to be because it was official policy for both states to achieve national integration. To do this, the state had to use its instruments of which the military is one. The study is therefore set in the context of state policy, the military's own behavior and the debate among scholars on the subject.

This chapter will articulate the general problem of ethnic integration, examine how the literature views the manner in which ethnicity has been regarded in the polities of Africa, then discuss the theoretical approaches to the military's role in ethnic integration. There will be an assessment of the models of ethnic integration and the linkages between theory and how the militaries responded in view of the contemporary thinking on national integration. The remainder of the chapter describes the methodology of the study.

³ Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: Essays in Comparative Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 75-106., S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), 110-128.

B. THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

1. The Concept of Nation

The problem of national integration is found in the wider concept of the nation. It is therefore important to identify the component parts of society that can be integrated and the means by which the integration can occur. Today, African polities find themselves within borders that were arbitrarily drawn by the colonizing powers in Berlin in 1884. Various ethnic groups found themselves entrapped within borders, but they were expected thereafter to operate as singular nations despite the absence of common cultural and historic bonds. Further to the already existing differences, most colonial powers encouraged ethnic divisions as instruments of control. Other powers like Portugal ignored ethnicity and adopted assimilation strategies for qualification to citizenship. Cultural and historic bonds are necessary for the "routinized affirmation of common sentiment" by nationals, a phenomena Emile Durkheim called the "conscience of the collective."⁴ The feeling of common sentiments by nationals is the objective of the national integration strategies discussed in this study. In many ways colonization started the process of nation building in Africa, but it did so in a contradictory fashion. For control purposes they employed the divide and rule strategy to make colonization cheaper. Colonial authorities were not concerned with ethnic integration directly, but they pursued policies of absorption of Africans into the modern economy to meet their labor requirements. It is in the production relations that they introduced in mining,

⁴ Quoted in Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn, ed., *Nation Building and the Politics of Nationalism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989), 4.

farming and industry where contemporary African nationalism began. Contemporary African nationalism therefore emerges from the modernization process of western education, industrialization and urbanization.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) which affirmed in 1963 that each country should build a nation around the existing borders was itself a product of the triumph of that nationalism. The OAU was actually affirming the modernization processes of colonialism as an asset on which future modernization might progress. It will be argued in this study that the formula for national integration lies in modernization, except that this time it must be modernization without colonization.

It is important to understand that colonialism in Africa was a very short lived affair. After the second world war, a period of about 60 years from the time of the Berlin conference, colonization proper started to crumble and de-colonization took its place. This is a short time compared to the example of colonialism in the Americas.

Essentially the nationalists who led their countries to independence still had their roots in the ethnically based peasant societies from which they had emerged. The modernizing aspects of colonialism had not destroyed the original ethnic communities. It means therefore that nation building strategies had to account for ethnic differences because the class based society had not yet been formed by the short lived "colonial enterprise." However colonialism had existed long enough to create the infrastructural basis of nations. The higher the level of development of the infrastructure left by colonialism, the better prepared such a country was for nation building. Clearly the OAU

based its policy of legitimizing these countries around the colonial borders because the nationalists in each country were confident they could build a nation.

The existence of many ethnic groups within colonial borders is in itself not the main problem in nation building, but the lack of horizontal linkages in the form of social and economic interests that form the basis of classes was the main problem. In any case most nations were created on a multiethnic basis. The existence of stronger intra-ethnic bonds within underdeveloped societies brings challenges for the new political class in its nation building effort. The question is whether to adopt strategies which increase the horizontal linkages between the ethnic groups, rather than to adopt the easier route of exploiting ethnic differences. The majority of the African political class appear to have adopted this easier route.

2. Modernization Theory

Anthony Smith, who says that all nations have an ethnic origin, identifies two models by which the nation may be conceived to have emerged.⁵ One model considers the nation to be a modern phenomenon brought about by political actions of the modern ethnic elite, who rebel against cultural colonialism, or that it is the political entrepreneurship of the same elite, who use ethnicity as instruments for the struggle for wealth and power. Within the modernist concept of the origin of nations, Benedict Anderson says that the nation is an imagined community because a nation comprises individuals who are sentimentally committed to each other and to that community, even

⁵ Anthony D Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing Inc, 1986), 6-18.

without necessarily knowing each other. This was made possible by the development of print language that was able to bring together a wide section of people around cultural symbols.⁶ For print capitalism to bind together many societies, it is important to have a high level of literacy. In many ways the modernist theory agrees with the source of African nationalism, which was the colonial elite who brought print capitalism and through education, they created the African elite to which they handed over power during de-colonization. Education, which is a vital part of any modernization process is essential for national integration. Modernization processes such as the ones described above are expected to replace an ethnic culture with a national one in order to form the basis for national integration.

Modernization theory suggests several methods by which ethnic culture can be displaced, through a process of de-tribalization, to a modern one that is applicable to all citizens. It is thought that modernization forces such as wage employment, urbanization, mass media, education or commercialization, tend to reduce ethnic conflict. Explaining modernization theory, Abner Cohen said that if two cultures interact in a political and economic system, people from either culture who face similar social challenges will find each other. This process weakens tribal alignments and they eventually disappear.⁷

⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: New York: Verso, 1996), 134.

⁷ Abner Cohen, ed., *The Lesson of Ethnicity: Introduction in Urban Ethnicity* (London: Tavistock 1974), 22.

Cohen's thinking is challenged by Uchendu, who draws his criticism from the Nigerian experiences where he observes that "...the new class-based socio-economic stratification is a cultural mask behind which lie deep seated tribal values which continue to influence the value systems of our elite."⁸ This observation suggests that the political class maintains essentially tribal values. The lack of integration in Africa is caused fundamentally by tribally based values, and the disuniting actions of the political elite is a symptom of the persistence of these basic value systems. For example, ethnic societies found in urban areas indicate a strong sense of ethnic community. Offering patronage, the political elite utilize these socio-political organizations to further their own political and economic interests. According to Uchendu's observation, the elite succeed in dividing the people because ethnic values are already deep seated.

Another variant of the modernization model is the "political party brokerage thesis." The assumption behind such a strategy is that political parties in their effort to broaden the support base in order to win elections, will formulate ideologies which cut across parochial interests. It is observed that political parties can achieve this if there is no dominant ethnic group in the party. The higher the dominance, the less need for the dominant party to appeal to other ethnic groups.⁹ For example, the 1979 constitution for Nigerian transition to the second republic required that a presidential candidate had to get at least 25 percent of his votes from each of the states. The creation of the two party

⁸ Victor Uchendu, *The Passing of Tribal Man: A West African Experience, in the Passing of Tribal Man in Africa* (Netherlands: E J Brill, 1970), 51-65.

⁹ Robert Bates, "Ethnicity in Contemporary Africa," *Eastern African Studies Series* 14 (July 1973): 56.

system during the abortive transition under General Babangida in 1990, also followed this concept.

Another possible strategy, suggested by Karl Deutsch, involves a four-stage concept that anticipated that political integration would take place through social mobilization and assimilation. The first stage is characterized by open or hidden resistance to integration; the next stage is passive compliance at the state's urging; the third is active support for a common state, but with continuing ethnic or cultural group cohesion; and the fourth stage is the integration at the language and cultural levels.¹⁰ Deutsch's concept is useful in that it can give us indicators as to whether national integration policies are succeeding or failing, and therefore requiring policy re-evaluation. This concept is also useful for showing that national integration is a process, and the process is complete when cultural displacement has occurred. The concept suggests that the state should be the active agent of integration especially in the first and second stages of the process. However, no time scale is given for each stage, nor are indicators for the end or the beginning of each stage. The final stage of Deutsch's model has not been observed to occur anywhere, including in developed countries.

The detribalization concept, the party brokerage, and the state-assisted stages suggested by Deutsch all fall under the modernization theory of national building in ethnically divided countries. Modernization theory supports intervention through an external stimulus such as a political party, or some other organ of the state that could

¹⁰ Karl Deutsch and William Foltz, eds., *Nation Building* (New York: 1966) 8-9, adapted from Peter Osei-Kwame, *A New Conceptual Model for the study of Political Integration in Africa*, 34

include the military. The removal of colonial institutions of modernization means that the success of such a strategy depends upon how society responds to an internally designed modernizer, as opposed to one working from without such as a colonial power.

Modernization or cultural displacement strategies have not been successful in integrating African communities, but it is important to assess whether this is because the strategies were poor or the society was not responsive to these strategies. Before proceeding to that part of the analysis, we need to consider another theory of national integration.

3. Primordial Theory

While modernization theory essentially posits a model of cultural displacement, other scholars have argued for a model of cultural adaptation. The theory of origin of the nations says that ethnicity is an extension of kinship, and a vehicle for the pursuit of collective goals. Ethnicity is therefore "natural, universal and perennial" and in that sense the origin of nations is primordial.¹¹ If the origin of nations is primordial, then current strategies of nation building by African polities, which are supported by the OAU, should be reversed so that borders are redrawn to match ethnic boundaries inside which nations will emerge. However, no nation in the world emerged in this way or resembles ethnic purity of this sort. Nations are artificial constructs, built out of a process of integration.

¹¹ Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*, 12.

4. Integrated Theory

Anthony Smith therefore argues for a view of the nation that accepts a bit of both the modernization theories discussed in the last section and the primordial theories of the origin of nations. From the modernization theory he accepts that ethnic structures may be changed by social mobilization, a factor which endorses the strategies of the elite in nation formation in Africa. From the primordialists he accepts that the core values that attach the individual to the community change more slowly. He explains that the "historical memories" and central values, which he describes as a complex of myths and symbols, are diffused through a given population and transmitted to future generations. In other words, the changing ethnic structures carry the old values with them. That probably explains the observed behavior of communities found in new social structures such as in urban settings, immigrants or refugees, who continue to associate in their in their ethnic communities even after living in multi-ethnic environment for many years. The model of integration suggested by the acceptance of the integrated theory of the formation of nations is cultural adaptation, a model that is opposed to the cultural displacement proposed by modernization theories.

Describing cultural adaptation, Osei-Kwame says that "...integration in Africa's ethnically pluralistic states is a learning process in which individual tribesmen cultivate a habit of accepting, tolerating and cooperating with other individuals from different ethnic groups while not repudiating their own ethnic groups."¹² The assumption that ethnic

¹² Osei-Kwame, *A New Conceptual Model for the Study of Political Integration in Africa*, 57.

integration can occur among separate group identities is the basis of the cultural adaptation model.

This model has both a horizontal and vertical integration dimension. Horizontal integration assumes cohesion within each group so that as a unit it engages in rapprochement with other groups. Such rapprochement assumes that each group is "rational politically because it can assess the costs and benefits accruing to them from their association with others."¹³ Horizontal integration also assumes that the groups know each other well enough through education, urbanization or commerce so that this knowledge has a positive effect on attitudes concerning inter-ethnic association.

Using the concept of horizontal integration, Fein identified four different types of societies representing various levels of ethnic group interaction. He identified the society with a high level of internal cohesion and inter-ethnic group interaction to be the one that is integrated. Other combinations of group cohesion and inter-group interaction are the transitory society, the caste society and the detribalized society, depending on the level of internal cohesion and level of interaction with other groups. For example, in a caste, group members have little interaction outside their own, but they are highly cohesive within the caste.¹⁴

¹³ Ibid., p.58.

¹⁴ "A Typology of Horizontal Integration," adapted from Leonard, J Fein., *The Ecology of The Public Schools: An Inquiry Into Community Control* (New York: Pegasus, 1971), 46, quoted in Osei-Kwame, *A Conceptual Model for The Study of Political Integration in Africa*, 60.

The most interesting society from a policy perspective is the detribalized society. It represents a low intra-group cohesion but a high inter-group interaction. It represents an ideal nationally integrated society. The cultural displacement model discussed in the last section aims for this kind of society as well. The post-independence policies on nation building assumed such a perspective, but such policies did not succeed because the infrastructure for horizontal integration is undeveloped in Africa.

If the groups are to integrate horizontally, the majority of the members must encounter each other at some arena such as commerce and a high level of urbanization. These conditions require a high level of development. If we are to go by this observation, it can be concluded that previous policies on national integration, that assumed to achieve this position, were impractical. African society is characterized by high intra-group cohesion and therefore integration would represent interaction between self contained groups. Strategies of integration must recognize and utilize this fact.

The second component of the cultural adaptation model is vertical integration that describes the level of support for modern institutions. That arena is the state and its institutions, which all groups must feel is relevant to them. All groups must feel that the institution of parliament represents their interests. For example, the problem of how minorities should be represented has not been satisfactorily dealt with, causing political instability, civil wars and calls for secession. The problem for Africa is that the majority of the people are in tribal communities, and interact with the state only through their ethnic elite. This factor is mainly responsible for the development of patron client relationships which causes corruption and difficulties in the application of the rule of law.

The low level of development of the people is directly responsible for the weaknesses of the institutions in Africa. Since they do not force the politicians to be accountable, their support for modern institutions is therefore very weak. In short, the adaptation theory of ethnic integration reveals critical factors that need to be taken into consideration when crafting strategies for national integration. First, for horizontal integration to take place, it has been revealed that interaction with other ethnic groups is essential, but the elite have a monopoly on such interaction. Second, for vertical integration to take place, a high support for modern institutions is essential, and here again the elite have more access to these institutions.

5. Cultural Displacement or Cultural Adaptation?

Given the two theories of national integration described in the last two sections, critical issues facing African policy makers arise. The cultural displacement model, on one hand, shows that post colonial governments wanted to achieve integration while assuming de-tribalized societies when these societies were on the whole still tribal. The intra-cultural cohesion provided by ethnicity could not be broken by centralization of state power or continuous appeals for national unity. The cultural adaptation model, on the other hand, shows that integration can be achieved by the ethnic groups from their tribal positions. The ethnic groups need to interact across tribal lines so that they know each other, and also vertically through a high support for modern institutions. Both cultural adaptation and cultural displacement can be achieved through mass education, urbanization, trade, growth of civil societies and other forms of social mobilization. Whether the appropriate model to be used is cultural displacement or cultural adaptation,

the above discussion points to a critical factor for national integration, and that factor is social modernization.

How is the theory of the origin of nations useful for this study? It is useful in that if the "myth symbol complexes" which bind individuals into a community are durable, the strategies of nation builders should include accepting that a nation can be built around existing ethnic communities. One of those strategies may be to align communities which inhabit the same territory with new "myths and symbol complexes," such as the historical struggles against a common enemy such as colonialism, or the struggle for economic and social development to bind together members of different communities. Nation building becomes an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process. Ethnicity is regarded as an asset for nation building because all groups are regarded as essential to the country and not as a problem. An ethnic group that is considered an obstacle in the nation building process may not contribute positively to that process. For example if the Tutsi are considered to be a problem or a liability in the Congo, then the process of nation building in that country can not proceed smoothly. How does the theory of the ethnic origin of nations relate to the post colonial African context? The colonial governments that were headed by the appointed governor were centralized administrative structures that collected taxes and maintained law and order. Accountability to the people by this administrative structure was very weak. The post-colonial state inherited this apparatus together with its weak culture of accountability. The culture of weak national consciousness and accountability among the elite led them to utilize ethnic bases for championing political agendas. While official policies in post colonial Africa considered

ethnicity to be a liability to nation building, the same officials used ethnicity when it suited them. The failure to recognize the utility of ethnicity as a basis for nation building seems to have backfired because post-colonial Africa has been characterized by ethnically motivated tensions and violence.

The theory of the ethnic origin of nations suggests that nation building can occur through a slow process of national integration. A solution that allows for the reduction of tensions so that the diffusion of "myth-symbol complexes" can take place. At Africa's current level of modernization, national integration which is part of nation building must proceed from the acceptance of ethnic communities and not from ignoring them.

Relating nation building to the reduction of tensions, James Coleman and Carl Rosenberg say that national integration takes place at the territorial and at the political level. Territorially, national integration involves the "progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities in the process of creating a homogenous territorial political community."¹⁵ At the territorial level then, it is not necessary that there be one culture, only that tension between cultures are reduced.

Politically, national integration refers to the bridging of the "elite-mass gap," in order to bring more people to participate in the political process, and establish accountability of the elite to the population. The inability of the masses to control the

¹⁵ James Coleman and Carl Rosenberg, *Political Parties and National Integration in Africa* (Berkeley University of California Press, 1964), p.9, quoted in Claude Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration* (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1967), 13.

political behavior of the elite is called the "elite-mass gap."¹⁶ The elite-mass gap arises because the masses, still composed largely of peasants, do not fully comprehend the concept of the nation state. The elite-mass gap affects national integration in two ways. First, since the masses are passive, political competition occurs only between the ethnic elite, with the masses relying on the patronage of their respective ethnic elite to relate to the state. The reason for the existence of the elite-mass gap is the lack of sophistication by the masses, which allows the political elite to ignore institutional controls. The elite-mass gap therefore arises because of underdevelopment in society. Second, the elite who emerged from the masses, bring to the bureaucracy a parochialism which weakens the development of a tradition of bureaucratic impartiality, a factor which exacerbates existing tensions.

6. State Society Relations

Weak national integration in African states is basically caused by under - development which is manifested in low horizontal and vertical integration as described in the last section. Secondly, underdevelopment causes weak state-society relations, a factor that weakens the state.

How does such a weak state arise? It arises because the masses are ignorant concerning their "rights" in the state's decision process. The elite acts as the political patrons of the masses and since horizontal integration is weak, each ethnic group is

¹⁶ The concept of the "elite-mass gap" was developed by Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New Nations: Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 11 (1960) 3: 265-92, cited in Claude Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration*, 68-81.

represented at the state level by its own elite. This way, political competition between elites becomes ethnic competition. Most important, national resources are controlled by the state because private capital accumulation is very low. Competition for control of the state is very stiff, and the system leaves losers very bitter to the extent that they mobilize their ethnic bases against the state. On the other hand the winners are very insecure, suspicious of any desire for local liberties and therefore quickly resort to repression.

It is evident that policies such as the one-party states and the abolition of local leadership have backfired. In 1966, Milton Obote of Uganda quarreled with the chief of the Buganda local administration. He attacked the chief's palace using the army, and the chief escaped to exile. After this Obote suspended the constitution and declared himself president of a one-party state. Obote was latter ousted by the army which had helped him establish the one-party state. This phenomenon was repeated in other parts of Africa, for example in the kingdom of Lesotho where premier Leboa Jonathan also exiled the king. In Zambia there was an uneasy relationship between the Barotse paramount chief and Kenneth Kaunda.

Many of these nationalist leaders, given their background described earlier, did not necessarily come from the dominant ethnic groups. Their behavior towards the local leadership of such groups reveals their attitude to ethnic integration. They regarded traditional leadership as a threat to national unity. With regard to national integration, they regarded ethnic cohesion as a liability, which went beyond the mere feeling of a threat to personal power. For example, during the constitutional crisis which led to the quarrel with the Buganda traditional leadership, Milton Obote said that his government

"...will never be dislodged from power by any mathematical manipulations," referring to the Buganda ethnic group's numerical superiority. In the following year he changed the constitution so that the Buganda ethnic group would be neutralized.

Some writers, such as Kofi Busia, oppose the kind of centralization that occurred in Uganda and other countries and they call for unity in diversity.¹⁷ They think that multi-ethnicity is compatible with national integration and by implication, disagree with state efforts to downplay ethnic expression through institutional mechanisms such as the one party state. If different tribes feel that the state meets their needs, they will not have difficulty being loyal to the nation from their tribal positions.

According to this argument, the main challenge is for the African state to find a new sense of legitimacy so that the different ethnic groups can be loyal to the new nation on that basis. The state has so far relied on the boundaries set in Berlin in 1884 for its *raison d'être*, but unfortunately these have not been universally accepted.

The unifying principles advanced by the liberating fathers (e.g., like Kwame Nkrumah's African socialism, Kenyatta's *harambe*, Nyerere's pan-Africanism, or Kaunda's one Zambia-one nation) have not provided effective political socialization for integration despite the high stress that each of these leaders placed on these policies. These leaders officially downplayed ethnicity, or acted as if there was some inherent spirit of African oneness that required arousing. Since such a spirit does not exist, such

¹⁷ Kofi A Busia, *Africa in Search of Democracy* (New York: Praeger, 1967), 117, quoted in Osei-Kwame, *A New Conceptual Model for the Study of Political Integration in Africa*, 19-20.

policies on national integration were not consistent, and as a result they sometimes caused more division.

The point is that the failure of the policies of national integration followed by African leaders is not because of the policies per se, but rather the socio-economic environment in which those policies are applied. The elite would not succeed to divide the people if there was adequate horizontal integration among them. Patronage would not corrupt the leaders in the way it did if people demanded institutions which ensured accountability. Lack of both vertical and horizontal integration makes national integration at lower levels of development very difficult. Horizontal and vertical integration are increased by modernization, making modernization to be such an important factor in national integration.

The search for integration strategies continues. Since social modernization is a critical factor in national integration, the military is often thought to be a modernizing institution. In this study, the military will be evaluated through comparison to see whether the military can be an instrument of national integration.

C. THE MILITARY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION

Can the military be an instrument for national integration? If the military is to succeed as such an instrument, its members must change their behavior, and then transmit this new behavior to society. An analysis based on behavior poses a clear challenge to establishing clear behavior standards and patterns which would be attributed to the influence of the military institution on society. The internal dynamics of the military and

how it influences key areas of societal integration enables those outcomes of internal dynamics to influence society in the direction of integration.

How do these state or societal demands impact on the military's internal dynamics to produce desired outcomes? As will be explained below, politicians often give the military the task of demonstrating the unity of the nation through its recruitment and promotion policies. In an ethnically divided country such a demand on the military may be interpreted in the context of the ongoing ethnic rivalry. Does the military interpret demands to integrate as legitimate demands in relation to what it perceives as its *raison d'être*? Dietz, Elkin and Romani, state that the military wants to relate the demand to integrate to its ability to succeed in the tasks of national security, and not view it as merely an arbitrary requirement handed down by politicians with no professional military relevance.¹⁸

1. The Theory of the School of the Nation

One theory advanced in the 1960s viewed the military as an ideal instrument of development in the developing world. According to this "school of the nation theory" the military would act like a training institution for patriotic and national values. The argument was that experience in service to the whole nation with a multiethnic cadre, plus the theoretical knowledge and practical skills obtained in the military would

¹⁸ Henry Dietz, Jerrold Elkin, Maurice Rommani, *Ethnicity, Integration and the Military* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, No. 3, 1991), 7-8.

transform servicemen attitudinally and develop a models for citizenship in general.¹⁹ Morris Janowitz describes this modernizing theory when he says that the military may serve as an agent of social change, by developing in its members a sense of national identity.

The internal dynamics of the military was therefore thought to be naturally homogenizing, and this military quality could be transmitted to the rest of society.²⁰ A nation which suffered colonialism and wants to incorporate diverse ethnic and tribal groups may use the military to impart the "social psychological" element of national unity. Military training and culture emphasizes corporate group identity, through the monopolized function of serving as the nation's instrument of violence. This is a unique national task that aligns the soldier to the nation rather than to an ethnic group. In the military there is a higher opportunity for equal treatment, and the result is a higher sense of cohesion and social solidarity because men and women of various regional and ethnic backgrounds are given a common experience and come to think of themselves in national terms.

Janowitz identifies two different aspects concerning the military as an "agency for building a sense of national identity." One aspect is the service role just described. The other aspect of military influence involves the symbolic value of the armed forces for the population. Unfortunately most militaries of sub-Saharan Africa are too small to have a

¹⁹ Morris Janowitz, *The Military in The Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: Chicago University Press,1964), 82-84.

²⁰ Ibid., p.84.

major impact on their nations. However in countries such as Nigeria and South Africa where civil wars were experienced, there was sufficient mobilization for the military to penetrate the social fabric of the nation. The military is a symbol of the nation. This is why it participates in displays at national ceremonies. Militaries are also called to alleviate hardships in communities befallen by natural disasters, and they are often the main element in the civil defense programs of nations. The "school of the nation" theory of the military agrees with the detribalizing or modernization theory of integration because the military acts as a school where a serviceman comes out after the military service as more national than a tribal man. According to this theory, depending on the size and demands of a particular military, the military can contribute to national integration.

Crucially, if the military is to modernize society, it must itself be more modern than the society. The problem that arises is how the military can achieve the task of detribalizing society when it resides within that society. The school of the nation theory had the same weakness as the cultural displacement model described earlier, and would not work in a society with a low level of development. The school of the nation theory was therefore the wrong model for the level of development. That problem led to the recognition of the existence of "ethnic security maps" which affect the military's role in national integration. "Ethnic-security maps" refers to the conceptualization by the political elite that a particular ethnic composition of the military would give maximum security to the state. The ethnic elite that does not control the state has its own security map, and it restructures the military when ever it gets a chance to control the state. The

security mapping is therefore an elite-security mapping because it is the political elite who demonstrate this behavior.

2. The Concept of "Ethnic-security Maps"

The behavior of the military, where it had seized power, was observed to be no different from that of the civilians they replaced in power. This factor contributed to the refutation of the "school of the nation theory."

A specific refutation of this theory emanates from a study by Cynthia Enloe on the military and ethnicity. The basic argument in this theory is that ethnicity is dynamic and it therefore finds its way into the military. The issue arises from the *raison d'être* of the military which is the "abstract notion of national security." Since the military is controlled directly by the state, as distinct from the nation, the security of the nation and that of the state will be secured if their interests coincide. The problem is that the dynamism of ethnicity causes ethnicity to move into the state and through the state into the military. If the state control is skewed ethnically, control of the military will be ethnically skewed to ensure more of the security of the dominant ethnic group rather than the security of the nation. Enloe observes that the military will be unsuccessful as a national integrator because the interests of ethnic elite find their way into the military. The military is forced to pursue security interests according to the "ethnic-security maps."²¹ Ethnic-security maps refer to the perception of the political elite about the ethnic composition of the military that the elite regards as safe.

²¹ Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980), 1-22.

All those programs suggested above to strengthen the internal integrative forces that could be transmitted to society are pursued within the military in the context of elite's security maps. In the event of a military coup, where the state and the military are one, the failure of the military to act as an instrument of national integration becomes acute as the military imposes the "ethnic-security map" directly. Ethnic security maps exist because ethnic cohesion is strong, and this suggests that for the military to succeed as an instrument of integration it must be working within a strategy which recognizes this fact. In developing the theory of integration earlier, it was found that the cultural adaptation model meets this quality.

The theoretical approach put forward by Enloe rests on the existence of security maps. However, what arguments are advanced for the existence of ethnic security maps? There is evidence that these ethnic security maps enter the internal military dynamics and under given circumstances they may spill over to society as a whole. In support of the existence of ethnic-security maps, Horowitz says that the "military is both a resource and an object of ethnic conflict." He further states that the military reflects the divisions in society, and if ethnic composition of the military does not mirror the ethnic composition of society, the divisions in the military become politically significant.²² It becomes politically significant because the government then seeks to correct this lack of congruence by interfering with appointments and promotions in the military. In correcting the situation, the politicians sometimes breach the core values of the military.

²² Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 443.

These values include the maintenance of seniority in promotions and the following of the administrative chain of command. Political interference in military affairs then constitutes the first major breach of civil-military boundaries.²³

In many newly independent African countries such as Ghana, Uganda, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, the military reacted to this kind of interference with military coups, which reflected a breakdown of these civilian-military boundaries. Following Horowitz's "breach of boundaries" theory, the implication is that there is a certain type of political military relationship which is based on non-interference in each other's territory of values. It can be said by inference that in order for the military to act as instrument of political integration, it must have corporate values which it passes over to society. Moreover, these values must mature within the military's institutional boundaries. However, this maturity will not occur if the political elite breach these boundaries to destroy the value basis of military professionalism such as, for example, the military's highly developed bureaucratic impartiality that was mentioned earlier. It is this military professionalism which society can copy to effect political integration among its members.

Horowitz's breach of boundaries theory refutes that of the school of the nation, but not that of Enloe's "ethnic-security maps." Horowitz shows us by the four African examples mentioned above that the military is a viable entity with independent values, which it sometimes protects strongly when those values are attacked. It may also show us that if the central military values are not destroyed from outside, the military may serve as

²³ Ibid. p. 469.

a "school of the nation." Horowitz does not provide a theory of societal integration, but shows the consequences to integration when the "ethnic security maps" circumstances exist.

According to Dietz et al., the theory reveals three factors that interact with each other to decide on the ability of the military to be an instrument of social integration. These factors are the military itself, the state, and the ethnic make-up of the society. According to the theory set out above, integration "can be represented by the binary interrelations of all three as well as by the fusion of all three simultaneously."²⁴ The state, military and ethnic composition factors should also be viewed in relation to the level of modernization of the society in which they operate. Society's modernization refers to its socio-economic development as shown by indicators such as size of the private sector, a diversified economy and sophistication of the citizenry. The more modernized the society is, the more likely the interactions of the three will enable the military to be an instrument of social integration. Analogous to this is the interaction of the air, moisture and a seed that generally produces plant life (social integration), but it is the availability of nutrients that produce quality growth and eventual fruit. In any society, the military will interact with the state and ethnic groups as explained above. Modernity of society is therefore a factor in contributing to the ability of the military to act as an instrument of political integration.

²⁴ Dietz, et al., p.14.

Raising the level of society's development makes it more sophisticated, therefore reducing the gap between the elite and the masses. A sophisticated society forces the elite to contribute qualitatively to the process of national integration. That will happen if there is not a big gap of sophistication between the elite and the masses. The "elite-mass gap" therefore presents a fundamental challenge to the political environment and civil-military relations in most parts of Africa. Whether any particular military can be an instrument of national integration will be answered by the interaction of the military with the elite, the state, and the society at the level of modernity depicted by each of these variables. The next section will examine how the factors discussed in the theory affected the performance of the military concerning national integration, and the civil-military relations that emanated from the interaction of those factors.

3. Effect of Level of Development

From the theory of national integration and those of the military as an instrument of national integration discussed in the previous sections, it has been established that the level of development is the fundamental variable that can make or break an integration strategy. First, considering modernization models of ethnic integration, they do not work in African societies because they are still too unsophisticated for modernization strategies to work. The main example was the use of state functionaries, such as the political party, as a broker between the ethnic groups. Many political parties broke into factionalism soon after independence. Those that did not break up were incapacitated by ethnic squabbles. Instability caused by these ethnic squabbles resulted in either military coups or dictatorships. State functionaries suffer from poor vertical linkages since the masses

can not control the political class. A political party or the military, which are modern institutions will not function as integrators if there is suspicion and tension. For the military it may even cause a civil war and the demise of the country as a political entity. Enloe argued that the political class impose their security maps on the military and therefore transfer the tensions of elite political competition into the military. If being ethnically divided is a bad thing, why do social forces not stop the political class from sowing seeds of division? This study argues that the behavior of the political class is only a symptom of the problems caused by the low level of underdevelopment. Development makes the masses to become sophisticated enough to demand more accountability from the political class. Consequently that class responds by establishing institutions to ensure this accountability.

Second, the model of cultural adaptation borrows from two opposed concepts. One concept is cultural displacement, a concept that allows for the use of state institutions such as a political party or the military as strategies for national integration as described in the last paragraph. It was found that these strategies do not work at a low level of development. The other concept is one based on the theory that the origin of nations is primordial and therefore the historical myths and symbols that hold each ethnic group change more slowly. Since nations have a primordial origin, the cultural adaptation model therefore allows integration to occur more slowly, allowing the horizontal linkages between the ethnic groups to evolve. Horizontal linkages develop through a process of modernization.

Theory has shown that if integration is approached only through state intervention, modernization of society is important for success. Also, if the state takes the primordial theory into consideration and adopts an adaptive mode in its strategies, it will still face the problems of development. This study will demonstrate through comparison that in Nigeria, where the level of socio economic development is low, such institutions could not succeed, because "ethnic security maps" easily entered the military. Consequently, the military failed to be an instrument of integration, even if at some point during the period under study it was playing a central role in the government. In South Africa, where the level of development is high, there were vertical and horizontal linkages because of industrialization and urbanization. Ethnic-security maps do not function in such an environment. As such the military is successful as an instrument of national integration. This study will assess how the level of development of the political elite, the state and society impact on the ability of the military to be an instrument of integration.

D. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

Nation building is crucially important for the developing countries of Africa. It is part of the development process, an issue whose path is being debated throughout the continent. This research will contribute both to the debate on development matters and more specifically to the military's role in that process. The military is important for stability, a factor that is vital for the modernization process. If the military becomes an instrument of the national policy of ethnic integration, this has implications for recruitment, advancement of its members, deployment and command of forces to

demonstrate this ethnic visibility. Such a policy has implications for defense resources management and also affects operational doctrine. This topic is therefore important because the above-mentioned factors affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the military.

Since the military is an instrument of the state, this study will reveal the state structures in a multi-ethnic African country. It is in the context of the specific state structures that the civil-military relations in a country can be crafted. This study seeks to contribute to the subject of civil-military relations in a post-colonial African context. The study can be used by politicians who may want to use the theory of national integration to design their defense policies and by those who think about nation building issues.

E. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE

The study will compare the activities of national integration by the military in the first six years of independence in Nigeria and the South African transition from *apartheid* and to majority rule. It will be demonstrated that the military's role in national integration results from an interaction of the political elite, the state and the society variables, at the relevant level of socio-economic development. The thesis should reveal why the Nigerian military was split by social forces, while the South African military was not.

Within the period under study, the political elite, the state and the society in each case did not change significantly. Since the level of socio-economic development of the variables is different in each case, this leads one to suspect that it is this modernity factor which caused the different outcomes. It will be shown that in both societies the political

elite wanted the military to protect their ethnic interests, but in the Nigerian case, they were unconstrained by the rule of law, causing the military to fail. In the South African case, the developed state institutions were constraining factors on the elite, as such the military was successful within the six year period. The next section explains the interaction of the military with the political elite, the military with the state and the military with the society.

1. Military and Society

The task will be to investigate the military interaction with society in each case, and to formulate an opinion about the effect of social forces on the cohesiveness in the military. The premise of such an investigation is that soldiers are members of society and as such they will react to social issues of economic, ethnic and general matters of governance. Their reaction to these issues depends to a large extent on how they sustain organizational legitimacy. That legitimacy may determine how they function as an integrating or modernizing force.

2. Military and Political Elite

The crucial issue is the nature of the "ethnic security maps" held by the civilian and military elites. Enloe says that state elites have in their minds clear expectations about the dependability of each ethnic group concerning state security and the current state structure. To maximize state security, "...it is important to state elites that they should create and maintain a pattern of ethnic relations and state-ethnic relations

that will maximize state security."²⁵ Each group is therefore treated according to its reliability in view of the elite-security mapping. The study should find out whether the military elite also perceives these state-security maps, and how far they operationalize them. If the military operationalizes ethnic-security maps to the disadvantage of their own cohesion this shows a weakness on their part. The strength of the military as an institution is crucial here. Can it withstand political pressures to defend its internal cohesion. The political process there fore needs to be looked at with respect to the political role of the military and the effect of ethnic divisions on civil-military relations.

3. Military and State

Three political and military relationships that influence the state security mapping can be identified. In one system the military officers are members of the ruling party and therefore participate in political decisions that affect the behavior of the military to social integration. Another type is patronage based linkages, where a patron -client relationship is developed between politicians and military officers. When a country is ethnically divided and clientalist linkages are established with politicians, this may cause cleavages in the military. Civilian control of the military may be enhanced, but in the long run it may undermine the integrity of the military, producing resentment on the part of military officers from disfavored ethnic groups. The third relationship is that of political neutrality. Political neutrality means that the military takes orders from the government of the day even though the political implications of those orders may not be pleasant to

²⁵ Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers*, 15.

the military elite. The corollary to this point is that if the government requires the military to implement a policy that it views to be emanating from an "ethnic-security mapping," the only factor which may stand between the military and its implementation is the lawfulness of the order. This thesis will analyze how each of the above three modes of state military interaction operated in each case and to what effect.

4. Level of Social Modernization

Why does ethnic engagement in the military become successful and positively affect the integration of society to some extent, such as in the South African or American military, and yet fail and cause more polarization as in Nigeria? The level of society's modernization, may be crucial in the interactions of the elite, state and society described in the above sections. Aspects of modernization such as the size and diversification of the economy, the development of social institutions, urbanization or level of literacy should affect the military as both a creator and a receiver of social values from its social environment. Scholars observed that in developing countries, the military was more modern than society. Expressing this view, Janowitz argued that, "...in general armies and their ambitious officer cadres are the focal points for overcoming barriers to modernization inherent in traditional value bases such as religion, and the varied ethnic value systems of sub-Sahara Africa."²⁶ Enloe, on the other hand, says that the "saliency of ethnicity in the state military" has not been decreasing for the last 150 years, as would be supposed by modernization theory. She further argues that although modernization is

²⁶ Janowitz, *The Military in the Development of New Nations*, 44.

increasing, it does not necessarily carry along an inevitable decline in ethnicity's relevance for military affairs.²⁷ This thesis is not about whether ethnicity persists with development, but it is about why some militaries despite being multi-ethnic impact positively to national integration while others do not. This debate shows that the level of modernization is a relevant variable to consider in assessing the ability of the military to be an instrument of national integration.

The dependent variable in this study is the potential for national integration. The independent variables, i.e., the elite, the state and the society are high for South Africa and they are low for Nigeria. Their effect on the potential for national integration will be assessed follows:

- The ability of the political elite to increase the potential for national integration will be measured by the level of ethnic cross-voting. The higher the level of cross-voting, the better the political elite positively affects national integration. A developed political elite will be less parochial and will therefore have horizontal linkages through commerce and industry that translate into political linkages.
- A case where politicians break the rules of bureaucratic impartiality, by unlawfully practicing ethnic favoritism, and get away with it, contributes negatively to national integration. The quality of a developed state may be measured by the strength of its institutions. Institutional weakness causes mistrust and tensions between different ethnic groups and negatively affects national integration. The ability of the state to

²⁷ Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers*, 212.

increase the potential for national integration will be taken to depend on the effectiveness of the state institutions to restrict politicians from breaking the law.

- The size of peasant population relative to urban wage earners, the literacy rate and the relative per capita income will be used to show the level of development of society in each case. If the population is peasant, poor and illiterate, it will fail to stop the politicians from manipulating the population through client-patronage networks. That weakens national integration by undermining the development of horizontal linkages.

5. Case Selection

Case selection is always problematic in comparative analysis. Since the results of the study concern the military as an instrument of national integration, the militaries chosen for study, must be based on similar doctrines, preferably western military traditions, which include that it must be apolitical. We can then investigate why there were different outcomes on militaries with similar orientations about politics. The political process must be subjected to influence by the ethnic elite who may or may not directly control the military. There must be sizable social categories that compete for economic and political supremacy. The two cases have been selected because of the similarity of the characteristics described above that were taking place during equivalent periods. The level of modernization will be applied to the variables identified in each case.

The study will utilize secondary data that deals with the military and ethnic integration in the two cases. Using the theoretical literature on ethnicity, civil-military relations and national integration, Chapter I suggested an answer to the question why the military fails or succeeds to be an instrument of national integration. The suggested answer was the differences in the level of socio- economic development. Chapters II and III will evaluate the hypotheses against the empirical data from Nigeria (1960-1966) and South Africa (1992-1998). Both cases are sub-Saharan countries with a history of ethnic division and conflict. They differ mainly with respect to the level of development. Nigeria has a low level of development, while South Africa has a high level. Chapter IV will provide a comparative analysis, conclusions and recommendations.

II. THE NIGERIAN MILITARY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION (1960-1966)

A. INTRODUCTION

Nigeria has 248 distinct languages, but two-thirds of them are united in three main groups. The other one third comprises minorities who for administrative purposes, the government considers them to be affiliated with each of the three main groups. The main three groups are the Hausa-Fulani of the Northern Region, the Yoruba in the South West, and the Ibo of the South East. Another important north-south divide is religion; because the north is predominantly Moslem while in the south there is a mixture of traditionalists, Christians and a few Moslems. Nigeria as a state is a colonial creation and it can be argued that colonial legacy concretized the ethnic cleavages between these three ethnic groups, because the British declared separate protectorates for each region in 1900. In the Northern Region a policy called indirect rule was established. The traditional rulers, *emirs*, were in charge of all administration with the colonial power being the general overseer.

In the southern regions the British ruled directly, encouraging education. The consequences of the education gap were far reaching, because when Nigerianization of the civil service began in 1948, the south dominated the civil service including the police and the officer ranks of the armed forces. Also of significance is the notable advance of the *Ibo* southerners, where education and Christianity had spread somewhat liberally.

They dominated the civil service and the bureaucracy to the extent that at independence most of the military officers were *Ibos*.

Very significant was the development of the colonial economy. Private indigenous enterprise was discouraged and replaced by statutory monopolies in agriculture, mining, transportation, communication or marketing. This means that after independence, the main sector of employment became the state. Control of the state as an access avenue to personal growth was the goal of political competition. In each of the three regions of Nigeria, there developed dominant classes who inherited the colonial structure and adopted its forms of administration.

This chapter will seek to prove that Nigeria's level of development was low. The political elite and the state were not developed enough to meet the challenges of national integration. The society was poor and largely illiterate, characteristics of a low level of development. The low level of development of these variables also affected the military to the extent that it could not act as an instrument of national integration. Each variable will be tested using the measures established in the methodology section above.

B. THE EFFECT OF THE ELITE

This section will assess the characteristics and the sources of the behavior of the Nigerian political elite and relate that behavior to its influence on the military. It will be shown that the political class was still in the process of formation, and did not have the modern characteristics. Its base was still the primordial social foundation of peasantry and tradition.

Northern Nigeria had existed before colonialism as a feudal state ruled by chiefs or *emirs*. Colonialism did not dismantle the feudal structure, but actually strengthened it through a system called indirect rule. The *emirs* were elevated by the system of indirect rule into local administrators who collected taxes and maintained law and order on behalf of the colonial administrator. This aristocracy shunned western education, allowing education to reach a few of its members, but preventing it from reaching the lower classes.

When transition to self-rule began in 1951, the political class in the north comprised the aristocrats, the few educated officials in the administration of emirates, and the wealthy merchants. This political class was consolidated around the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), a political party which was formed to dominate the politics of the northern region. The NPC became the vehicle for control of the federation as well. This was a sure way of protecting the northern establishment from being infiltrated by southern egalitarian ideas. The aristocrats were of the Fulani ethnic group, while the Hausa ethnic groups were mainly of merchant class, who financed the administration. The lower classes were kept in their place by a system of repression, and during elections their votes were ensured through a process of intimidation and where applicable by promises of the provision of amenities. The merchants were bought off by protecting their activities and incorporating them into the higher ranks of the NPC.

The political class of the south was formulated around traditional rulers, as in the north, but traditional rule in the south did not have the class stratification found in the northern feudal structure. The political class came from the rising commercial and

professional elite who controlled the ruling political parties. The public sector dominated the economy and therefore served as an instrument of class formation and consolidation.²⁸ A position in public office was an instrument of personal wealth.

Since to holding a political office requires the winning of elections, the strategy that the political elite utilized to win elections was the manipulation of ethnic pride and prejudices. This strategy was successful because most of the society was illiterate and individual interests were subordinated to the patronage passed to their communities by the political elite. The masses were cut off from any influence they could exert on the state, a situation that reflects a high elite- mass gap. In the absence of any horizontal integration, the economic and political power was in the hands of the elite. To measure the level of elite development, regional cross-voting was used.²⁹ The argument is that if the elites are socially and politically developed, they will be able campaign and obtain votes from across the ethnic spectrum. Table 1 shows the percentage of votes obtained by each of the three main parties in each region. The 1959 elections produced solid block voting based on regional lines.

²⁸ Diamond, *Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria*, 37.

²⁹ Data obtained from Richard Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 35-37.

REGION	North	Lagos	West	East	Variance
NPC	.61	.002	.01	.12	.07
NCNC	.16	.55	.4	.65	.03
AG	.17	.43	.49	.23	.02

Table 1: Level of Cross-ethnic Voting for Nigerian General Election (1959)

The winning party, the NPC had a big majority in the north, but lost heavily in the other regions. The large variance for the NPC means that although it won the elections, its leadership was accepted in only one region. The NCNC won most seats in the east, and also in Lagos. Lagos was declared a region for electoral purposes, because it was the federal capital, and had attracted many eastern and Mid-Western ethnic groups. That vote in Lagos does not reflect cross- ethnic voting, but reflects the ethnic ratios of the Yoruba and the alliances around the Ibo communities in the city. The Action Group Party (AG) of Western Nigeria won in the west. Each party only won in its region, a factor that shows that cross-ethnic voting was very low. This demonstrated a weak horizontal integration, in turn indicating a low level of elite development, because the elite could not sell their ideas outside the parochial confines of ethnic interests. The variances tell us the level of national acceptability, a high variance like that of the NPC, tells us that the party's acceptability is very low in most regions, but very high in one region. Since the 1959 general elections produced the dominance of three political parties (each in its respective region), a coalition was therefore necessary for national unity. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, NPC Vice President, became the Prime Minister after making an alliance with

the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), a southern party which was controlled from Eastern Nigeria. The AG became the opposition.

Each of these political parties also controlled the regional governments, where the federal system allowed them to have substantive economic resources at their disposal. These included public services such as marketing boards and development corporations. More power over the national economy was relegated to the center. In a country where the bulk of economic resources are in state hands, control of the political center was crucial.

Since the Action Group of the Western Region had to do something to participate in central decision-making, its position outside the government was creating an obvious disequilibrium in the process of resource distribution. The Nigerian crisis started after the elections in 1959, when the Western Region's leaders became divided on what strategy to follow in the face of their region being shut out of the mainstream of decision-making. Chief Awolowo the leader of the Action Group decided to infiltrate the North politically, in order to exploit divisions which existed there, in the hope of obtaining a majority victory against the NPC. He hoped to exploit sentiments against the feudal structure in the north. Other Action Group members led by Chief Akintola opposed this strategy, because they said that their resources were being used in a venture in the north that was not assured success. There was a split in the AG's ranks, and Chief Akintola's group joined the NPC, a move that isolated Chief Awolowo.

The gains by the NPC from the misfortunes of the Action Group in the Western Region destabilized the ruling coalition. The NPC, which was the majority party, could

use its new alliance to achieve a majority without its original coalition partner, the NCNC. The problem that began in the west destabilized the entire political system since the Eastern Region also found itself being marginalized in the same way that the Western Region had been earlier. The leader of the ruling NPC, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, a strong traditionalist who was the premier of the Northern Region, had become a political ally of Chief Akintola. The latter, unlike Awolowo, did not want to interfere with Northern authority relationships. Likewise, Ahmadu Bello said that he wanted the problems in the Western Region to be left for the leaders of that region to solve.³⁰ The policies of the parties towards the divisions in the Western Region became crucial in the alliances which formed in the election of 1964. Since the arrival of Chief Akintola's faction to the ruling coalition had created cracks in that coalition, the NCNC, controlled by the Eastern Region, now formed an alliance with Chief Awolowo's Action group for the 1964 federal elections. Sir Ahmadu Bello preferred an alliance with Chief Akintola's party, the rival of Awolowo's party in the west. The 1964 voting pattern indicated results similar to those in 1959. By 1965, the alignments and re-alignments described in this section had led the country to political chaos. Chief Awolowo was arrested while a state of emergency was declared in the Western Region to restore order. The type of political alliances which were being formed, show us more clearly that they were not contributing to cross ethnic understanding, but for the elite to establish new formula for accessing the resources of the state. Sir Ahmadu Bello's views imply that he was contented with each

³⁰ Richard Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties: Power in the Emergence of an African Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 151.

party retaining its ethnic block support. Such a view is obviously not contributive to national integration. The Nigerian political elite had failed to establish a stable political entity to integrate the ethnic groups in Nigeria. Larry Diamond offers the following explanation for this failure:

In a dependent colonial economy where economic opportunity was severely constricted ...where capital was scarce, indigenous entrepreneurship small in scale, private enterprise foreign-dominated and poverty pervasive and extreme....the achievement of this new status, and the accumulation of the wealth that marked it came to depend to a large degree on the political office, connections and political corruption.³¹

The above quotation suggests that the behavior of the political elite was caused by the underdeveloped nature of the socio-economic conditions in Nigeria. The same parties that suppressed opposition in their regions were represented at the federal level. It means that there was no culture of democracy that they brought to the federal level. Effective power fell into the hands of the northern elite, who were worse in terms of suppressing democracy in their own region. As described earlier, with respect to the crises in the Western Region, the central government entered the fray as a competitor rather than an arbiter.

The lack of democratic appreciation could be found in all regions, despite a traditional democracy that had existed in the villages of the south. Village democracy was no longer able to deliver the values that were expected to flow from the new complex organization of the state. Independence brought higher forms of political competition for

³¹ Diamond, 33.

which village democracy was unsuited. Larry Diamond says that a deep commitment to democracy by the nationalists such as Balewa, Azikiwe, and Awolowo "...did not extend deeply below the top level of political leadership."³²

Specifically, the institutional role of a political opposition was not appreciated by the political elite. This phenomenon was discussed in the theory chapter where it was seen that the early nationalists assumed that ethnicity was displaceable by an inherent spirit of national unity. Any opposition was seen to be abnormal or even antisocial, such that it deserved to be sanctioned. That may provide an explanation for lack of tolerance in the north, although it has been blamed on the feudal system practiced by the *emirs*. The feudal factor can only be part of the explanation however, because this behavior was observed in the southern regions too. The theory section also revealed that it was also prevalent in the rest of Africa in the 1960s. In many ways nevertheless, the manner in which the *emirs* were able to adapt their system to incorporate commercial institutions, social services and various liberal reforms was remarkable.³³

The lack of integration politics in Nigeria cannot be blamed on the leadership of the northern elite alone, but on the political elite as a whole. From the voting pattern in the general elections of 1959 to 1964, it is clear that the electorate was regional in political preference. The political elite encouraged this because it was an easy way of

³² Ibid., 70.

³³ Richard L. Sklar, "Crises and Transition in the Political History of Independent Nigeria" quoted in Paul, Berkett and Crawford Young, eds., *Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria* (University of Rochester Press, 1997), 17.

getting votes, but as discussed above, the problem lay in the underdeveloped socio-economic basis of the country. The divisions found among the political elite also affected the military. The degree of ethnic divisions in the country would have required a far higher organizational culture in the military to protect itself from such divisive conditions.³⁴

In 1961, the government introduced quotas for recruitment of military officers. It gave 50 percent to the north and 25 percent to each of the other two regions. It then lowered the minimum academic standards for entry in order to accommodate northerners, because there were few secondary schools in the north. The Sultan of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, broke civil-military boundaries by visiting educational institutions in the north and making speeches to encourage youths to join the army. As a regional premier, his responsibility did not extend to the Army, which was constitutionally at the federal level.

In the chapter on theory, it was explained that when the ruling elite are not confident that the existing ethnic composition in the army is reliable, they will want to change that composition. This is because the political elite construct their own "ethnic-security maps" with respect to the military's loyalty. The ruling northern elite, as shown by the behavior of Sir Ahmadu Bello, was not comfortable with the security provided by the existing composition of the officer corps, which had more southerners. The Minister of State to the Army explained the policy of quotas to the senate by saying that,

³⁴ S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), 115.

We introduced the quota system in the army thus preventing the possible fear that the army would sometime become unreliable. If any part of the country is not represented in the army, we may harbor some fear that a particular section will begin to feel that it is being dominated. But now the country's safety is assured.³⁵

The short-term effect of the quota system was to raise fears among the southern officers that preferential recruitment would be extended to promotions. Raising such fears and suspicions caused tensions in the army and eliminated the prospect of it becoming an instrument of integration.

This policy was viewed in the same manner by southern politicians. All policies were viewed from the point of view of ethnic security and well being. Fear and suspicion replaced evaluation and evidence, with rumor acting as the catalyst of decision-making. These are the characteristics of weak political culture, which according to Finer, creates the environment that encourages militaries to make coups against the weak states.³⁶

C. THE EFFECT OF THE STATE

At independence, Nigeria inherited a British-style parliamentary democracy with power distributed among the legislature, judiciary and the executive. Universal adult suffrage operated in the south, but was restricted to males only in the north. Political and

³⁵ Quoted in Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 244.

³⁶ Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 115.

civil rights were formally guaranteed in the constitution. Moreover "...the press was wide, free and fearless."³⁷

However political activity was marred by undemocratic practices. Party supporters tended to be overzealous, with political and economic pressure exerted on opponents.³⁸ The constitution set up federal and regional legislatures, giving wide powers of local administration to the regional governments. Though it also allowed the federal government to intervene in a region during a period of emergency or when a region endangered the continuance of the federation, the federal parliament did not intervene if a regional authority seriously endangered the rights of the individual within that region. The position that resulted from these constitutional arrangements were that the ruling parties eliminated all opposition using unlawful means. In the north where the right to political organization was restricted by powers of chieftaincy and traditional rule, opposition was almost wiped out.

The weakening of political opposition in the regions had a serious destabilizing effect on the federal system. A 100 percent victory in the federal elections by the dominant party of the north would cause it to command more seats in parliament than all parties in the south combined. The trend in the regions was already moving towards this result, and this worried the southern politicians.³⁹ The polity cannot rely on the maturity

³⁷ Ernest Ogunade, *Freedom of the Press: Government and Press Relationships in Nigeria* (Illinois: University Press), 165.

³⁸ Ibid., note 37.

³⁹ Diamond, 89.

of the actors for democratic practice. The state institutions need to enforce restrictions on the politicians. The ability of the state institutions to do this is a good measure of the development of the state. The following examples show the weakness of the state in this respect.

One great institutional weakness of the Nigerian state was revealed in the census of 1962. The returns from this census showed that the country's population had increased by 50 percent within a ten-year period. The problem was that in some regions increases were incredible: Lagos had increased by 133 percent, the East Region by 72 percent, and the Western Region by 69 percent. These figures were disputed, and a recount was conducted in 1963, producing inflated figures for those areas like the North, which had shown lower figures in the first count.⁴⁰ The census dispute was so bitter that it sowed seeds of mistrust for a long time to come. The state was powerless in the face of violation of rules by politicians who repeatedly inflated figures in an attempt to increase their region's strength in the federal government.

A second example of institutional weakness was shown by the riots against southerners. These riots occurred in the northern city of Kano.⁴¹ A continuation of the bitterness of the census disputes, northern politicians began to call for the expulsion of all southerners, especially Ibos from the north. The Kano Native Authority issued an order for Ibos to leave within forty-eight hours. This was obviously illegal, but the authority

⁴⁰ Ibid., 133.

⁴¹ Ibid, 131-161.

got away with it. Evictions of Ibos were registered elsewhere in Katsina and other northern towns. The federal premier apparently failed to solve the matter or punish the politicians involved, despite presentations to him by representatives of the victims.⁴²

The Nigerian state therefore, operated under a democratic constitution, but without democratic practice because the state had institutional weaknesses. It was unable to defend its legal framework against gross violations by ambitious politicians. The written law only went so far, strong state institutions were necessary if the constitutional provisions were to be implemented. The institutional weaknesses of the Nigerian state were also reflected in its relationship with the military.

The Nigerian army had been founded on the basis of political neutrality along British lines. British officers commanded the army until after independence. However, political neutrality on the basis of military professionalism in the Huntingtonian sense needs to be balanced with what others such as Finer have said on the subject.⁴³ Samuel Huntington implied that professionalism was sufficient to ensure the political neutrality of the military when he said that "...military officer must remain neutral politically."⁴⁴ Finer emphasized the political environment in which the military operates, such as the level of "political culture."⁴⁵ The environmental factor tested the neutrality of the

⁴² John Mackintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics* (Evanston: North West University Press, 1966), 557.

⁴³ Ibid., note 36.

⁴⁴ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 71.

⁴⁵ Ibid., note 36

Nigerian army in 1964, when the state non-executive president, Dr Azikiwe, used his position as the commander-in-chief, to back his decision to annul the election results.

The president's party had boycotted the elections, accusing an alliance led by the Prime Minister's party of electoral malpractice. The General Officer Commanding, Major General Welby-Everard, the Navy Commander, Commodore Wey and Inspector General of Police, Mr. Edet, had anticipated such a situation, and had taken legal advice from the Chief Justice, who indicated that they were under the operational command of the Prime Minister.⁴⁶ When the President summoned them to enforce his decision to annul the elections, they made him aware of this position.

The decision by the president to use the military to intervene in an election dispute shows that the political elite did not hesitate to use state machinery to advance personal political objectives. The same behavior was observed in the last section with respect to the use of state institutions to intimidate opposition. Either the president knew that he could not use the military, but was ignoring constitutional provisions, or he was ignorant of his constitutional role in relation to the executive institutions. Either way it shows the low level of political culture of the top politicians. If there had been a weak institutional response to the president's requirements, a major incident such as a military coup would probably have occurred. The chief justice, representing the judiciary, and the military commanders united to put the president in his constitutional position. Military control

⁴⁶ Luckham, *The Nigerian Military 1960-67*, 237.

was still strong because although some of the officers were in favor of supporting the president, they did not get the support for such a move.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, the position of the Nigerian military's political neutrality became weak after the British officers left command to the Nigerians. Nigerian commanders tended to be tied into the structures of political influence and control. Luckham reports that "...the top military elite was divided by personal rivalries as well as by friendships between senior officers and members of the political class."⁴⁸

The encounter between the President and the British officers described above reflects a glaring example of how an institution can be strengthened by a strong state. The ability of the British officers to defend the military institution had depended on the strength of the British state which they represented in Nigeria. The weakness of the military institution became clear soon after the British Officers left. When political riots took place such as the ones at Kano, which were described above, soldiers participated by taking sides, yet the soldiers got away with such an professional behavior.⁴⁹

D. THE EFFECT OF THE SOCIETY

This section focuses on the ability of the society to support structures for regional integration. Is the society empowered by literacy, individual incomes and private capital

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 238.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 239.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 299.

to withstand the forces for division. To this effect social empowerment means the socio-economic foundations for a society to concern itself with issues of governance.

The political organization of Nigeria varies between the north and the south. In the north, the traditional leadership of the sultan of Sokoto and the emirs under him is absolute. An aristocracy called *sarakuna* developed around this leadership. It rules over the lower classes called the *talakawa*. Membership in each class is generally fixed at birth. The north was the last of the three regions to modernize. It started to modernize when self-rule became imminent in the 1950s. It had become clear that if it did not modernize, it would be dominated in the federal bureaucracy by the southerners who had adopted western education earlier.

When the north started to modernize, it selected the members of the aristocracy, and kept the rest of the population in a backward state. A new class of elite that did not owe allegiance to the *emirs* emerged from this modernization process. It was easy for this elite to form an alliance with the traditional rulers. Through the use of traditional control, this alliance was able to hold the north as a united region in competition with the southern region. Since the constitution required that political power be obtained through elections, political aspirants had to seek favors from the emirs so that the *emir* could then extract the votes from his subjects, and this he did using intimidation and patronage. The electoral candidate had to show that when elected he would be able to extract resources from the political process. The electorate was kept in line through a process of coercion and patronage by both the *emir* and by the politician. With this social background, the

traditions of northern society were not able to contribute democratic practice to the federal polity.

The Yoruba society of the western region was also hierarchical in structure, but a Yoruba monarch is elected by a council of chiefs. Moreover, an unpopular monarch can be deposed by the chiefs. There are no distinct classes in Yoruba society, and the royals are not necessarily wealthier than the non-royals. A high premium was placed on hard work, personal achievement, and occupational excellence.⁵⁰

The Ibo of eastern Nigeria were even less hierarchical, lacking centralized kingship institutions. Organization was around the village, and the village representative assembly was its main political organ with each village remaining autonomous. All adult male members and some notable women took part in political debate. At the individual level, "...hard work, self assertiveness, enterprise, individualism and personal achievement were stressed."⁵¹ The significance of the traditional mode of political organization for the three main ethnic groups is important for the integration of the Nigerian society. There was not much commonality in the traditional political organization of the ethnic groups that could be the basis of Nigerian political integration. The Nigerian politicians themselves knew this, and accepted the fact by adopting the British parliamentary system. The parliamentary system was acceptable to both parties since there was no Nigerian traditional system to adopt and the parliamentary system had

⁵⁰ Crawford Young, "Nigeria a Political Entity and a Society." article in Berkett and Young, eds., *Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria*, 53.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 54.

international legitimacy. However, the Nigerian society lacked the modern basis upon which to create the national consensus required for a parliamentary system to function. At independence, Nigeria was in the bottom 20 percent of the 100 poorest countries in the world.⁵² As shown by Table 2, the majority of Nigerians were illiterate peasants. The mass of the unemployed and rural peasants lived in abject poverty to which those who had escaped would not want to return.

Peasants	90% of total pop.
Literacy	5.7% of pop.
Per capita income	\$130
Manufacturing	6% of GDP
Services	33% of GDP
Mining	13% of GDP
Agriculture	54%
GDP	\$6bn

Table 2: Socio-economic Data of Nigeria (1965)⁵³

⁵² James Coleman, *Nigeria; Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), 141-161.

⁵³ Economic Data from The World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (Washington: World Bank, 1993), 224-225.

Table 2: Socio-economic Data of Nigeria (1965)⁵³

A society at this level of existence is powerless to control a powerful group like politicians. The people would probably be too busy on the more pressing problems of subsistence, and would submit to any promises of a better life. Those who migrated to the cities turned to members of their own cultural groups for psychological and sociological solidarity. It is from those who had secured good jobs or made it in business that the elite emerged. Neither the traditional forms of governance, nor the existing socio-economic conditions equipped the Nigerian society to enforce institutional controls on the politicians. The politicians possessed the education and the material conditions that enabled them to make the moral claim to lead. In this environment, a politician was assured of support from his ethnic base in the struggle against opponents. Patron-client relationships therefore developed between the political class and their ethnic bases. What the political elite had in common was the realization that control of the state was vital for political survival. Through government contacts of all kind, the state was the source of enrichment for those who occupied political office. At the federal level, the member of parliament was not concerned with strengthening the state, but to find what could be got from it for himself and his ethnic clients. Alternative to such communal connections would be class connections that provide integration between the classes from different ethnic backgrounds. Private capital accumulation was weak, therefore the state was

⁵³ Economic Data from The World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (Washington: World Bank, 1993), 224-225.

responsible for the regulatory and distributive function making the political class who are the champions of the state to be very powerful. Nigeria therefore, became a very corrupt society, while the state became a very weak state.

According to the findings in this section, the lack of ethnic integration in Nigeria was caused by the existence of ethnic patron-client relationships that connected the political class to a base of supporters. If the ethnic basis were literate and self-reliant economically, the political class would mobilize on a different base from the ethnic one. The socio-economic conditions of the peasantry ensured that the majority of people were not integrated horizontally with other ethnic groups. It also ensured that they had no other means of advancing themselves other than through their ethnic elite who represented them to the state. The ordinary people were like a captive market for political entrepreneurs. The problem was not the entrepreneur, but the low level of societal development as shown by the conditions of poverty, illiteracy and weak private capital that enabled such a situation to exist.

The weak political culture of the society affected the institutions of the state. The civil service, the police, army and the judiciary were all weakened by political interference. There was favoritism in promotions on the basis of nepotism and ethnicity. The cumulative effect of this tribalism is that it sowed mistrust, causing anxiety and insecurity among the entire bureaucracy including the military. For example, in the Western Region, there was a calculated use of tribal statistics by politicians to effect appointments in the public corporations. Chief Akintola made use of such statistics in a

white paper entitled "The New Political Alignment in the Western Nigeria."⁵⁴ It claimed that the Ibos dominated the public corporations such as the Nigeria Railways, the Ports Authority and the University of Ibadan. In Eastern Nigeria, the regional government presented its grievances in the following manner:

Take a look at what they have done with the little power we surrendered to them to preserve a unity that does not exist:

- Kainji Dam Project- about \$150 million of our money when completed- all in the North.

- Bornu Railway extension-about \$75 million of our money when completed all in the north.

- Spending over \$50 million on the Northern Nigerian Army in the name of the Federal Republic.

- Military training and all munitions factories and installations are based in the North, thereby using your money to train northerners to fight southerners....

- Now they have refused to allow the building of an iron and steel industry in the east and paid experts to produce a distorted report.⁵⁵

There was a rumor that Northerners were planning a coup to replace the federal Prime Minister, Sir Abu Baker, with Sir Ahmadu Bello, who was at the time the Northern Premier.⁵⁶ This was possible because the federal premiership of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa had been negotiated between the parties, and had been given to a more acceptable

⁵⁴ Diamond, 143.

⁵⁵ Quoted in Mackintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics*, 557.

⁵⁶ Quoted in Luckham, 41.

figure rather than to Ahmadu Bello, to whom it should have been given since he was the leader of the ruling party. There was so much mistrust that even rumor could be taken for fact. This particular rumor had very serious consequences for the Nigerian army and the nation, because it led to a pre-emptive military coup in January, 1966. It was a bloody coup in which the leadership of the ruling coalition, which included the federal premier and two regional premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello And Chief Akintola of the Western Region, were killed. The prominence of Ibo officers among the coup leaders caused a rumor to spread that it was a coup to assert the domination of the Ibos. The Army split into ethnic camps, such that a counter coup in May 1966 sparked a civil war which lasted for two and half years.

The military coup itself may not be the point of interest here, but rather the manner in which it exposed the divisions in the military which were on political and ethnic lines. The military lost its internal legitimacy as the military governor of Eastern Nigeria, Col. Ojukwu, suggests about taking orders from the capital Lagos:

...Whoever you put in Lagos, I say this, will not command the loyalty of the East if that person is not acceptable to the East, this the fact of today. So many things have happened and we no longer trust each other.⁵⁷

Clearly the Nigerian military was now divided internally and as such it failed to be an instrument of national integration.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 149.

E. CONCLUSION

What really caused the Nigerian military to fail as an instrument of integration? Horizontal integration may be used as a measure of the level of development of the political elite, because it reflects interests emanating from common social and commercial linkages. Such linkages in a country as large and diverse as Nigeria, come with modernization. Cross-voting can be used to measure the modernity of the political elite because it would be expected that politics reflects social and economic interests. Using cross-voting as a measure of elite development, it was found that the regions in Nigeria voted as blocks with little support for candidates whose party leadership was based outside their region. Thus, cross-voting was low, reflecting a low level of elite modernization.

The policies towards the military reflected that the political elite had strong elite security maps. The military was required to give preferential treatment in recruitment to the north. Northern politicians made speeches about building a military that was deemed safe using ethnic criteria. These policies sowed seeds of mistrust and insecurity within the military itself.

With respect to the state, the level of development of the state can be measured by the strength of its institutions. Do politicians break the law, and are they subsequently not held accountable? The Nigerian state revealed low levels of development through the non-observance of the rule of law. The political process was marred by the intimidation of opponents and the rigging of official census and electoral figures. There was a high level of corruption, abuse of power, unlawful dismissal on the grounds of ethnic origin

and political murders by people who were known, but the state was powerless to deal with these problems. These data are taken to be evidence of a weak and underdeveloped state.

The example of a strong institution had been provided by British military officers with regard to the constitutional crisis in which the president wanted to back his position with military force. The officers politely advised the president of the constitutional position with regard to the operational use of the military. The military institution started to weaken soon after the British left. Senior officers were developing friendships with selected senior politicians. Military discipline declined as seen by soldiers participating in factional fights and politically inspired riots. The institutional weakness of the state soon weakened the military's ability to be seen as a neutral force which could be an instrument of national integration.

Nigerian society demonstrated a low level of development because it was feudal in the north, peasant, illiterate and poor. It was therefore subject to manipulation by the political elite who used intimidation and patronage to ensure loyalty. Military organization was not strong enough to resist the culture of corruption and patronage networks which had infected the society. Suspicion and tension, which were prevalent in the bureaucracy, soon affected the military as well. The coup of January 1966 was an example of how the split along ethnic lines in the society had affected the military. The military was also split and the society began to drift towards civil war. The Nigerian military had failed to be an instrument of national integration.

III. THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

A. INTRODUCTION

South Africa was not colonized in the in the same way that Nigeria and other African countries were colonized. When the European countries decided how to colonize Africa at the Berlin conference in 1884, South Africa was already incorporated in the world economy, selling gold, copper and agricultural products such as wool. South Africa was comprised of four self-governing territories, the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, the Cape of Good Hope and Natal. The first European settlers who arrived at the Cape of Good Hope were Dutch traders who in 1652 set up a halfway station for their trade with India. As a result of war between England and France, the English captured the station from the Dutch because the Dutch were allied to the French.

Since then, the development of South Africa has been linked to competition between the descendants of the Dutch settlers on one side and the English on the other. The Dutch settlers, also called Boers (a Dutch word which means farmers because of their major pre-occupation) evolved to form a distinct ethnic group called the Afrikaner. They called themselves Afrikaner because of the culture and language which had evolved over the years of settlement in Africa. The differences between the English and the Afrikaner were responsible for the creation of the four republics mentioned above. In 1910, after a war between these groups, they agreed to unite under the Union of South Africa, a self-governing colony under British influence.

After World War II, African nationalism became very important in the history of South Africa because the blacks began to demand majority rule. They clashed with Afrikaner nationalism that wanted a republic in South Africa in which the Afrikaner dominated. In 1948 in a general election in which only whites voted, a new right-wing Afrikaner dominated party, called the National Party, won. It immediately had to deal with the race issue, which at the time meant formulating a policy towards black nationalism, the demand for majority rule.

The national party adopted a policy called apartheid, or separate development of the races. In practice this policy resulted in giving racism official status, where by the black people would receive low-class treatment in the economy and social services only in designated areas which were separated from white areas. The policy did not work as had been planned because the majority of South Africans who viewed the policy to be racist actively opposed it. However, considerable modernization of the country took place during the exclusive rule by the Afrikaner nationalist party, which lasted for forty-four years.

The composition of the military in 1992 was very complicated. First, there was the South Africa Defense Force (SADF), and five different armies created to protect the black peoples' homelands, which had been created as part of the separate development policy of apartheid. In addition to these were the forces of the liberation movement, the Umkhonto Wesizwe (MK) and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA).

The current military, which is a result of the integration of the forces mentioned above, is called the South Africa National Defense Force (SANDF). The success of the

integration process which resulted in a unified military, bears testimony to the arguments of this study which are that the high level of development encouraged national integration. The next sections will assess the effect on the level of development by the elite, the State, and the society on the potential of the SANDF to be an instrument of national integration.

B. THE EFFECT OF THE ELITE

The major political players in South Africa are the African National Congress (ANC), the National Party (NP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). There are also fifteen other political parties, of which the Pan African Congress, the Democratic Party and the Freedom Front provide a significant blend in the ideological spectrum of South African politics.

Historically, the contentious issues in South African politics have been represented by the ideologies of the ANC and the National Party. Until the 1990s, the political history of South Africa was dominated by discussions about whether to introduce majority rule, which meant black rule, or to continue with minority rule, which meant white rule. Apartheid was invented to solve this problem by creating a separate white homeland and several ethnic-based black homelands in which both races would become majorities in their own areas. That was supposed to solve the minority-rule versus majority-rule issue forever.

Assuming that the politicians who formulated racial segregation had noble intentions of conflict resolution, the problem that arose with this formula was that

resource apportionment could not easily be distributed fairly. Without fairness the policy was recognized as institutionalized racism, and it therefore became a source of conflict in South African society. Today the South African political elite comprise individuals who belong to groups which fought against each other for almost a century. The formation of the ANC, which dates as far back as 1912, was formed to oppose the government laws of the Union of South Africa that were increasingly discriminatory to the Africans. The ANC's argument was that since the black people were indigenous and in the majority, and the whites were in the minority, the right to rule belonged to the black people.

Successive white governments responded to African opposition by intensifying apartheid. It was made official policy after the National Party came to power in 1948. Opposition to apartheid increased and the state responded by stiffening the laws to protect apartheid. Pierre du Toit reports the banning of no fewer than 98 organizations between 1950 and 1988, and the detention of as many as 73,000 individuals between 1960 and 1988.⁵⁸

The other four political parties, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) the Pan African Congress (PAC), the Democratic Party (DP) and Freedom Party (FP) also emerged to represent each side of the ANC and the NP. The ANC, which was more radical, called for majority rule immediately while the IFP suggested a moderate reform orientation. The IFP quickly lost support in the 1980s as more people began to support the ANC's stand. It later began to look more like a Zulu ethnic party.

⁵⁸ Pierre du Toit, *State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa* (Washington: The U.S. Institute for Peace Press, 1995), 185.

The Democratic Party was liberal white, and represented mostly English-speaking people, whereas the Freedom Front represented the more right-wing Afrikaners. The ANC won the election of 1994, followed by the National party, and the IFP was third. The rest of the parties obtained each, less than 5 percent of the vote. The three most successful parties, the ANC, the NP and the IFP formed a coalition government.

In order to assess the level of development of the political elite, the researcher used cross-ethnic voting to evaluate the ability of this elite to effectively campaign and obtain acceptability in each of the regions. The results at Table 3 show the percentage of the votes obtained by the three most successful parties in each region.

Area	EC	ET	KZN	NWC	NC	NT	OFS	GTN	WC	Var
ANC	.84	.81	.31	.83	.49	.92	.77	.59	.33	.04
IFP	.002	.015	.48	.004	.004	.001	.006	.04	.006	.02
NP	.1	.1	.1	.1	.4	.03	.14	.27	.56	.03

Table 3: Cross-ethnic Voting in the South African Election of 1994⁵⁹

All the parties contested in all the provinces and obtained some votes. The winning party, the ANC, won in 7 out of 9 provinces obtaining over 30 percent of the votes in each province. Also the range of variances, which look at the spread by the electorate's preferences between the parties is close at 0.2 i.e.,(0.4-0.2). The level of cross-ethnic voting indicated by the level of acceptability of the winning party in each

⁵⁹ Data adapted from R. W. Johnson and L. Schlemmer, *Launching Democracy in South Africa: The First Open Election, April 1994* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 377-401.

region and the spread of support for each party shows that the level of development for the political elite is high. It is high because for a political party to be accepted across the ethnic divide, its leadership must be propagating a non ethnic based political agenda. This shows the level of political maturity in the country.

A survey of elite attitudes towards civic and public organization conducted by Hennie Kotze and Pierre du Toit is illustrated at Table 4. The results of the survey supported the election results by showing that the South African elite is more oriented to ideological than to ethnic sources of political differences.

The data are from a 1992 sample of 2282 positional elite. The following Question was put to the respondents: " Please indicate how sympathetic or unsympathetic you feel towards the following institutions." The choices were presented as a Lickert-type scale measuring "very sympathetic," "sympathetic," neutral," "unsympathetic," and "very unsympathetic." Forty six variables were included in the factor analysis, which is a statistical technique for determining the degree to which a set of variables is part of a set of common underlying phenomenon. The closer the numerical value of each reading to 1.00, the stronger the underlying commonality. In this case the common phenomenon is the extent to which civic institutions are perceived to coalesce with political institutions into a cluster of bodies to which individuals either are or are not attracted. Six such clusters (factors) were identified with principle component extraction with orthogonal rotation, the first three together explained 28.9 percent of the variation. The cut off point of 0.5 was used in the analysis.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ From du Toit, 189.

	Factor1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6
	State	Alternative State	Liberals	Right Wing	Co-optees	Africanist
Organizations						
Broederbond	0.79115					
Fedrasie Afrikaanse Kultuur	0.78040					
NG-Church (Dutch Reform)	0.75515					
Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut	0.71416					
Afrikaans Press	0.70027					
SA Broadcasting Corporation (TV)	0.68375					
National Party	0.65142					
House of Assembly	0.63156					
SA Defence Force	0.59076					
Big Business	0.58399					
Civil service	0.56656					
State president	0.52991					
SA Agricultural Union	0.52527					
Courts	0.50961					
Conference of SA Trade Unions		0.76303				
Umkhonto we Sizwe		0.76131				
African National Congress		0.73014				
National Education Coordination Committee		0.72499				
SA communist Party		0.72217				
Civics		0.71612				
SA Council of Churches		0.71445				
Soweto People's Delegation		0.71345				
People's Defence Committees		0.68695				
Alternative media		0.58123				
Democratic Party			0.70286			
Institute of Multi-Party Democracy			0.68552			
Urban Foundation			0.65821			
Inst. Democratic Alternative for SA			0.59861			
SA chamber of Business			0.59861			
English Prss			0.55936			
Afrikaner-Weernstandsbewegings				0.82217		
Conservative Party				0.79499		
Afrikaner-Volkswag				0.76401		
House of Delegates					0.66530	
House of Representatives					0.64587	
Homeland Leaders					0.53779	
Inkatha Freedom Party					0.51365	
Azanian People's Organization						0.73980
Pan African Congress						0.73640
National Council of Trade Unions						0.52650
Percentage of Variance	28.9	17.3	6.9	3.5	2.7	2.7

Table 4: Factor Analysis: Elite Attitudes Toward Civic and Public Organizations⁶¹

⁶¹ Ibid., 190-191.

Table 4 shows that when South Africa began the transition in 1992, it was an extremely divided country. Some people supported the existing state that was represented by the National Party as shown in Factor 1. Others supported extreme views such a purely Africanist view as shown by Factor 6. Very important is the intensity with which a particular cluster held its views, as shown by the each variance. The Africanists held the most inflexible position with a variance of 2.7, though fortunately they were not the main contenders on that side. However, the supporters of the state with a variance of 28.9 and their main opponents with 17.3 were both flexibly sympathetic to their ideologies. When views of opponents show this level of flexibility, it reveals an opportunity for conflict resolution since each side has room for accepting a different view.

Further, the survey revealed that in each category, there was no correlation between support for the type of state preferred and a particular ethnic group. For example, among Afrikaner, some preferred a right-wing racist state, while others wanted reforms. Among the Africans, people within an ethnic group took different positions along the political spectrum. For example among the Zulu-ethnic group, some supported the Bantustans represented by Factor 5 while many others supported Factor 2. In each cluster there was a strong presence of civil society, which shows that social issues dominated the agendas of political agitation. If ideology has superceded ethnicity as a basis for mobilization in South Africa, it would show a high level of development of the political elite. Such a high level of elite development would also have a positive effect on the military as well.

An example of the effect of the level of development of the elite was shown by the success of the integration process of the many forces that existed before 1994 into the SANDF. Of particular significance was the convergence of ideas on the nature of a national military as opposed to a liberation movement, or to one which serves ethnic interests, as the SADF was. At a seminar organized by the Royal Institute of International Affairs UK, the commander of Umkhonto Wesizwe (MK), Mr. Joe Modise drew respect from his opposition in the SADF concerning defense matters.⁶² Through such understanding, it was possible for the Mk and the SADF to be integrated, and for the SADF to accept the need for affirmative action, which was being extended to the MK personnel. This understanding percolated down to the middle ranks of both armies.

Why was it easy for the government forces to reach consensus with the military elite of the liberation forces? The answer lies in the convergence of ideas regarding integration, ideas not only from the military, but also those held by the political elite.

First there was the political elite who were in agreement as to the direction of the military integration. The absence of elite security mapping made it easier for the military to adopt professional approach to integration. Secondly was the military itself, because it served their corporate purpose to succeed in integrating the forces. It is difficult to achieve the second without the first. Joe Modise emphasized the need for re-training of all the former non-conventional forces in order to fit in a national army.

⁶² William Frank Gutteridge, *The Military in South African Politics: Champions of National Unity?*

(London: RISCT, 1994), 7.

The success of the integration of the various forces, which had supported political parties before, was due to the political elite not having transferred elite-security maps into the military. Elite security maps did not enter the military because the political elite had reached a level of development which allowed them to organize despite ethnic politics. We saw earlier that political support was clustered around ideological and not political positions.⁶³ Since there is no basis for the political elite to organize around ethnicity, the military has a chance to be professional if it is not interfered with by the politicians.

C. THE EFFECT OF THE STATE

Parliamentary democracy began very early in South Africa, starting at the Cape of Good Hope in 1872, when this British Colony was granted responsible government. Responsible government allowed for the establishment of a Parliament of the settler representatives to assist the resident governor in administering the a colony. The Boer Republics in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal also established some form of elected representations. The first all South Africa government was established in 1910 as the government of the Union of South Africa, with a Parliament at Cape Town and seat of government in Pretoria. The republican government was set up in 1961, and majority rule achieved in 1994.

The importance of this is that South Africa has been ruled through the institution of parliament for well over one hundred years. This is significant because, when the transition to majority rule constitution was drawn up, it was by the South Africans

⁶³ Ibid., note 57.

themselves rather than by a colonial power. The interests of a colonial power wishing to extricate itself from a colonial responsibility do not necessarily coincide with the interests of those who will have to live with the constitution after ward.

From this history then, it is clear that the state institutions and the government were established in South Africa through the legislative process. The unfortunate aspect is that the democracy was applied only to the white population before 1992. The democracy of 1992-1998 benefited from the institutions and the culture of democratic practice that had existed for whites for 300 years, starting at the Cape of Good Hope, gradually spreading to the whole country, and consolidating with the formation of the union in 1910.

The creation of an indigenous democracy such as in South Africa did not occur in the other countries of sub-Saharan Africa, such as Nigeria. Over the years, starting with European settlements, state institutions have been built which have acted as controls on the behavior of politicians. The first victim of institutional control was the ruling party in September 1996. The ruling party had made proposals that required party representation in the constitutional "watch dog" committees, and had also wanted a relative dilution of powers of provincial governments. The constitutional court overruled the ruling party's proposals and President Mandela accepted the ruling of the constitutional court.⁶⁴

The greatest test of institutional control on politicians also occurred with respect to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

⁶⁴ Mary Braid, "Tutu Report, Legal Move Splits ANC", *The Independent*, 31 October, 1998. Available [Lexis/Nexis] 6 December 1998.

The TRC's main tasks are to apportion reparations to victims, to grant amnesty to perpetrators, and to compile an official history of the nation's transition from raw repression to majority rule.⁶⁵

Since numerous human rights violations had occurred in defense of and opposition to apartheid, the success of the TRC was dependent on the candid participation of everyone involved. The truth is obviously difficult to obtain when people are forced to expose crimes and embarrassing actions attributed to them. It is even worse if they believe that their actions were in pursuit of a just cause. The ANC which was the ruling party at the time, had violated the rights of some people, believing that they were pursuing a just cause. In such cases, the easiest strategy to take is often to use the power one has to shield one's actions from the truth.

Vice President and President designate Thabo Mbeki, who has since taken over the leadership of the ANC, spearheaded a move to block the TRC report. He argued that the ANC's actions could not be compared with those of supporters of apartheid, because according to him, their cause was just. The ANC lost the court case on the grounds that the basis of the TRC was not political positioning, but rather about the violation of individual rights, regardless of the political motive. The chairman of the TRC, himself a supporter of the ANC during the struggle for liberation, said that "...the fact that they are the majority party does not give them privileges."⁶⁶ The point this illustrates is that

⁶⁵ John Streamlau, *A House No Longer Divided: Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South Africa* (New York: Carnegie Commission, 1997), 8-24.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

politicians will often want to break the rules for political capital. In this case the vice-president was appealing to the ANC's hard-liners, but in South Africa institutions like the courts are strong enough to stop the politicians from flouting the law, as they did in this case.

Institutional control had a history in the South African military as in other spheres of political life. The most critical instrument that legalizes the creation of an instrument of violence and guides its use is the Defense Act. The Defense Act sets out the military's mandate and how it is to be governed. The first Defense Act of South Africa dates back to 1912. It was debated in parliament whether to allow South Africa to join the British and Western Allies against Germany in 1914. Although the SADF had been an instrument of Afrikaner interests, it had operated within a system of laws. With respect to these laws, like other organs of government, the SADF was a solid institution. While the SADF had implemented policies that had a racial bias, it had done so on the basis of these laws originating from a legally constituted government.

The SADF demonstrated this on two occasions. One was the transfer of power from President P. W. Botha to President F.W. deKlerk in 1980. During Botha's regime, a policy called the "Total Strategy" was put in force to respond to increasing pressure on the apartheid regime. The security forces had by this policy been made central to the accomplishment of the goals of this strategy. The new president implemented many reforms that included the removal of the military from the role of central policy-making in government. Despite the fact that it endured forced retirement of officers, loss of prestige and re-assignment of roles, the military supported the reforms. The military even

supported the transition to majority rule, whereby their former enemies were to assume power and be their directors. Further more it took the lead in ensuring that the transition to majority rule was peaceful. This behavior of the military shows that institutional control not only operated in the government and bureaucracy, but extended to the military as well. During the more difficult period of military integration in support of the transition to majority rule in South Africa, the strength of institutional control became valuable. Obviously, they supported all these changes because they had a culture of institutional support for the rule of law, which is a characteristic of an elite that has reached a high level of development.

D. THE EFFECT OF THE SOCIETY

1. Elimination of Peasants

A crucial argument in this study is that peasantry, poverty and illiteracy create conditions for politicians to manipulate the population through patronage and intimidation. The reason that the politicians "care" about the peasants is because the peasants have the vote by which they can select from among the competing elite. In South Africa, the mass of rural peasantry was eliminated by many years of apartheid policies to the extent that politicians have to rely more on the urban vote. Apartheid had dispossessed the peasants of land and confined them to reserves, which lost value because of overcrowding. This forced the peasants to become wage earners. The former peasantry in South Africa is therefore a rural proletariat because income comes from either the urban migrant labor of the males, or the labor provided on commercial farms.

These proletarians are not as manipulable as subsistence peasants because they do not expect to rely on resources extracted from the state by the politicians.

As early as 1900, there was competition for labor among white farms, the mines and industry. A commission was set up by the Union Government to investigate the problem. The recommendation of this commission was the Native Land Act of 1913. From that point on, the peasantry in South Africa was set on the path to extinction. Mining, commerce and agriculture cooperated in search of cheap labor. The peasantry's land became smaller with the expansion of commercial agriculture. The youths migrated to the farms and to the mines to look for work, as poverty increased in the areas reserved for peasant settlement. Live stock diseases and frequent droughts depleted the reserves of any kind of potential subsistence to the peasants. Table 5 shows the number of peasants who emigrated from one reserve area, called Transkei, to both the mining areas and the commercial centers of the Transvaal.

Period	Leaving
1893-1899	303,182
1900-1909	425,398
1910-1916	425,722

Table 5: Patterns of Labor Migration from Transkei, 1893-1916⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Colin Bundy, *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 121

The main effect of the land-tenure policies was to transform the reserves into dormitories for labor supply, and to transform the peasantry over the years into a proletariat. The political fallout of this process is that politicians have had to campaign on the basis of issues that affect working class-people. The basis for economic and political dependency, which is the breeding ground for patron-client relationships, was destroyed over the years by raising the levels of development among the people from peasantry to proletariat. The other important development was the weakening of ethnicity as the basis of political organization because of urbanization and proletarianization. Further evidence for this is found in the history of the ANC. First, of all the political parties formed to champion for independence in Sub-Saharan Africa, the ANC is not only the oldest, but it was also the only independence movement that did not split on ethnic lines during the liberation struggle. Second, of all the political parties that waged an armed fight for independence, the ANC was the only one whose main military strategy was urban warfare. All the other armed movements in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia were rural because of the prevalence of the peasantry there.

2. KwaZulu-Natal

The role of the level of societal development can be made clearer by a quick review of the role of ethnicity and the political society of the province of KwaZulu-Natal before colonialism. The Zulu people had ruled most of the Area now called Natal through a monarchy. Colonialism and implementation of the Land Areas Act of 1913 (described above) confined this kingdom to a large reserve called KwaZulu. The apartheid policy of converting the larger of these reserves into nation-states called

Bantustans had caused KwaZulu to act in the capacity of a state. Unlike other Bantustans, KwaZulu had refused to accept independence on the terms set by the apartheid rules. A charismatic cousin of the Zulu monarch called Gatsha Buthelezi had formed a political party called the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), to oppose apartheid through peaceful resistance. This policy ran counter to the ANC policy of armed struggle. When the ban on the ANC was lifted under the new political dispensations, there were clashes for political supremacy in KwaZulu-Natal. The IFP was able to assert itself in the Bantustan part of KwaZulu-Natal, but failed to gain support in the commercial and urban areas of Natal.

Two important points arise out of the politics of KwaZulu-Natal. The Zulu people, a culturally cohesive ethnic group, supported two different political movements. The proletariat Zulu, were no longer under the traditional rule of the monarch and their social and economic conditions required a different political approach. Second, the IFP employed tactics of intimidation in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, but was unsuccessful except in the Bantustan part of the province.

The lesson from the analysis above on KwaZulu is that commercialization, urbanization and education can unite people around issues other than ethnicity as the proletarian Zulus did in joining other South Africans with similar views to support the ANC. Moreover, where a population is less developed as in the KwaZulu Bantustan, an ethnically based political party can successfully use intimidation and patronage to coerce the subjects into supporting it.

Using this analogy, just as the ANC failed to penetrate KwaZulu Bantustan, the Nigerian political parties of the early 1960's failed to penetrate the regional base of their rivals. Chief Awolowo of the Nigerian Action Group was more vigorous in this strategy of trying to extend his party nationally, just as Nelson Mandela did. Mandela was successful because his political landscape had undergone over 300 years of proletarianization, which had not occurred in Nigeria. Under the same conditions as in Nigeria, Nelson Mandela would probably have failed too. His failure in KwaZulu makes this point even clear.

3. Afrikaner Ethnic Group

Ethnic politics and patronage can be illustrated by following the history of politics in South Africa. As a result of the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, the Afrikaners did not want South Africa to be part of the British Empire. The majority of Afrikaners were farmers or low skilled workers. Compared to their English counterparts, they were poorer, less educated and more rural. The Afrikaner leaders wanted to change this situation by ruling the state and then using the state to improve their ethnic community. The only way they could capture the state was to use their numerical superiority over the English. To realize this, they had to accomplish two tasks. One was to mobilize all Afrikaners behind the National Party on an ethnic basis, a move that would ensure superiority over the English on the basis of numbers. To make this superiority permanent, the next task was to ensure that other races were disenfranchised. This process of racial segregation and disenfranchisement, called apartheid by the leaders of

the Afrikaner ethnic group was a scheme devised by them to dominate other ethnic groups.

The South African economy during the days of the Union of South Africa after 1910 was mainly extractive. Farming and mining were the bases of the economy, and therefore cheap labor was essential to minimizing costs. It was easy for the Afrikaner party, the National Party, to mobilize the farmers and the unskilled workers to support segregationist policies against the blacks. The white farmers were assured protection from the competition for land, and the supply of cheap farm labor. The white workers were protected from competition for jobs and the possible erosion of wages. English capitalists, who owned the mines, benefited from lower input costs overall. As long as the socio-economic conditions were at this low level of development, the system was in equilibrium.

In 1948, the National Party achieved its objectives of seizing political power with the support of the farmers and the workers. Adam and Giliomee report that the National Party got support from "...economically depressed areas, poorer farmers, unemployed poor whites' of small towns."⁶⁸ The political power that the Afrikaner Nationalists won was a result of a burning desire to raise their socio-economic status.

The years since 1948, saw a fundamental transformation in the South African economy, from an extractive, to an industrial and a service oriented one. There were large changes in the relative cost configuration of the economy causing a growth in the

⁶⁸ Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 268.

requirement for skilled relative to unskilled labor. The white workers became artificially expensive since their labor market was protected by apartheid policies. Also the relative economic power between the Afrikaners and their English counterparts had significantly changed. The economic forces behind Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid had weakened significantly resulting in apartheid being abolished in 1992.

The lesson that arises from the history of Afrikaner power and that of politics in KwaZulu is that ethnic mobilization is successful at lower levels of development, since the political elite can utilize patronage and intimidation to ensure support. To support the National Party, the Afrikaner political elite intimidated its ethnic base with propaganda regarding a communist and a black danger. However, it is important to realize that Afrikaner patronage was practiced where more socio-economic transformation had occurred than is ordinarily found in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. The patronage did not fundamentally undermine the bureaucratic capacity of the state as it does in the less developed countries of Africa. Nevertheless, the analogy of patron-client relationships and low levels of development still holds with respect to the pre-capitalist communities of South Africa discussed above. South African society is now at a high level of development as shown by Table 6 below.

Peasantry	Less than 30% of the pop.
Per-capita income	\$900
Literacy	82% of pop.
Commerce	3% of GDP
Mining	11% of GDP
Agriculture	5.8% of GDP
Services	49% of GDP
Industry	22% of GDP
GDP	\$19bn

Table 6: Socio-economic data for South Africa in 1994.⁶⁹

South Africa is now a developed country as shown by the size of the manufacturing and services sectors compared to the extractive (agriculture and mining) sectors. There is a strong capitalist economy supported by a largely proletariat labor and a strong middle class. Such a society is capable of supporting democracy and strong state institutions.

E. CONCLUSION

The comparatively high level of development of the South African elite, of the state and of society helped the military integrate within itself, thus establishing the

⁶⁹ Gerald Cubitt and Peter Joyce, *Journey Through South Africa* (Cape Town: Stuik Publishers, 1995), 5-15.

potential for being an instrument of national integration. Evidence shows that the political elite is not driven by ethnic considerations, because their power bases push for social issues. For example the ANC is backed by organizations such as the Confederation of Trade Unions, and the South African Council of Churches. The Democratic Party is backed by the South African Chamber of Commerce. Membership in an ethnic group did not automatically associate a person with membership in a political party. An assessment of cross-ethnic voting for the 1994 elections shows that the major parties had little variance in their support from the different regions.

Concerning the effect of the state, the South African state has been based on parliamentary democracy for over 100 years. Although the laws were applied segregatively, the culture of due process and the rule of law had evolved and was already firmly established before the period under consideration.

This culture of institutional rule was also applied to the military. For example, before the military was engaged in any war, the consent of parliament was always sought. The military always obeyed the orders from the government of the day. With this background experience, the military was able to train and integrate the unconstitutional forces that were required to be integrated by the transitional arrangements of 1993. This internal integration was a success because of the developed institutional strength found in South Africa.

Three major demographic phenomena were found to influence South African society. The first was the rural and urban proletariat which was created by the slow process of industrialization and commercialization which had taken place for the previous

300 hundred years and had destroyed the peasantry. Along with this development, it had also destroyed any foundations for ethnically based parties, as shown in the section on the elite. The second division was the growth of the middle class, created by the National Party policies of affirmative action for the Afrikaner ethnic group. Ironically, this development was mainly responsible for the weakening of apartheid, which the Afrikaner leadership had initially championed. The third was a very weakened traditional society because it could not support its population whose members had to migrate to urban areas to seek employment in commerce and industry.

It was shown that if a political party has the opportunity to capture a traditional ethnic community, which is poor and relatively ignorant, the political party can use intimidation and patronage to sustain itself. For South Africa, ethnicity of this kind had been weakened by societal modernization. The military, in turn, has not been affected by such patronage relationships because of a higher level of development among its recruitment base.

IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

1. The Political Elite

The measure used for the level of development of the political elite was the level of cross-ethnic voting. The leading political party in Nigeria had overwhelming support in only one geographical region and very little support in other regions. The high variance of 0.7 demonstrates this point. Table 7 shows that the variance of the winning party in South Africa is much lower than that of the winning party in Nigeria. These figures show that South Africa has a higher level of cross-ethnic voting than Nigeria. The variances for the three main parties in their order of size of votes are as follows:

	Nigeria	South Africa
1.	0.7	0.4
2.	0.3	0.3
3.	0.3	0.2
Range	$(.7-3)=0.4$	$(.4-2)=0.2$

Table 7: Comparison of Level of Cross-voting

The level of national acceptability for the main party in South Africa is higher than that in Nigeria. If it is reasoned that the acceptability of one party is the rejection of another in the same country, then the differences between the variances within that

country is the range of that rejection. In Nigeria the rejection of the major party is double that of the rejection in South Africa. These variance measures help to show the level of political polarization in a country. Voters in South Africa were therefore less polarized than voters in Nigeria: consequently, there was more cross voting.

When the political elite is polarized, each group wants to ensure that the military will not support the opposition. The main concern with reference to the effect of the political elite was whether this polarization is transferred to the military through the ethnic-security maps. This is what happened in Nigeria as the politicians interfered with rules for personnel recruitment to favor recruits from their own groups. In South Africa there was agreement among the elite on the integration process, and the outcome was successful. There is a positive relationship between a low level of ethnic polarization and elite agreement on major national issues. Using the measure of cross voting for estimating the level of elite development, it is found that the South African political elite is more developed than the Nigerian political elite.

2. Effect of the State

The effect of the state was indicated by the effectiveness of the state institutions as measured by the level of development of the state to control politicians. The level of development of state institutions does affect national integration because the authorities can break the law to achieve ethnic advantages. Where the rule of law is weak in curbing this behavior, tensions among ethnic groups rise, causing some groups to rebel as happened in Nigeria in 1966. In Nigeria, the state institutions were less developed as evidenced by politicians who falsified census figures for their regions and by the state that

did not punish offenders. Local authorities incited violence against ethnic groups from other regions by committing such extreme actions as confiscating their property and banishing them. State officials, like soldiers and policemen, participated in law breaking in support of ethnic-based claims. The state became very weak and could not enforce the law. The military as an institution was split resulting in a civil.

South Africa showed a higher level of development of the state. The success of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which implicated and embarrassed politicians concerning the gross violation of human rights they had committed. Senior politicians including the state president, ex-presidents and senior military officials, testified their wrong doing and pleaded for mercy. This showed that no one was above the law, and the politicians' responsiveness was an acknowledgement of submission to the law. The ruling party tried to muzzle the release of the findings of the TRC, but the court ruled against them. The findings were released regardless of being unpalatable to the politicians.

This high level of development of the state extended to the military. The various forces that comprise the SANDF were integrated under the law of defense which originated in 1910, and underwent amendments in 1952, 1957 and 1972. A defense force based on law subjects the military institution to the rule of law and to civilian control. It legitimizes the internal military administration and enforces discipline on the soldiers. Only when the military is internally integrated can it increase its potential as an instrument of integration. In the last six years, the SANDF raised its potential as such a force by passing this test.

The level of development of the state of Nigeria was lower than that of South Africa. In Nigeria most of the state institutions collapsed, and the split in the Nigerian military, which led to civil war, was a manifestation of the weakness of the state. The split was only more dramatic in the military because they possessed the means of violence. The results from the two cases serve to emphasize that the military is an instrument of the state. If one assumes that the two militaries are cohesive, South Africa achieved a peaceful integration because the state ensured that outcome where as Nigeria, military had to undergo a civil war to achieve this cohesion.

3. Effect of Society

The level of socio-economic development at time of transition was found to be higher for South Africa than for Nigeria on all relevant parameters, as shown at Table 8.

	Nigeria 1960	South Africa 1994
Peasants	90% of pop	30% of pop.
Literacy	5.72% pop.	82% of pop.
Per-capita income	\$130	\$900
Manufacturing	6% of GDP	22% of GDP
Services	33%	49%
Mining	13%	11%
Agriculture	54%	5.8%
GDP	\$6bn	\$19bn

Table 8: Comparison of Socio-Economic Data

The figures show that South Africa's economy comprised the more dynamic sectors such as manufacturing, while Nigeria was still basically agricultural. Economic development figures such as the per-capita income, Gross Domestic Product and the social development factors such as literacy and the size of the working class favor South Africa by large margins.

At independence Nigeria was in the bottom 20 percent of the 100 poorest countries in the world. Poverty combined with low literacy made it easy for politicians to manipulate society for personal gain. It was found that intimidation and patronage were widely used tools for obtaining votes from the electorate. The patron-client relationships developed in the Nigerian society more than in South Africa. There is a close linkage

between a low level of development, especially literacy and poverty, on one hand, and the development of ethnic patron-client relationships on the other.

It may be argued that patron-client relationships occur in all countries. While this is true, one may wonder why they are linked to ethnic divisions and instability in Africa. Clientelism is extreme in Africa to the extent of weakening bureaucratic impartiality. Clientelism is therefore an impediment to national integration, because the institutions that are supposed to constrain politicians are not functional. The low level of social development links such relationships to ethnicity. When public business is conducted in secrecy by people from one ethnic group, those from other ethnic groups view such behavior as a threat. Consequently rumors substitute facts and the system runs on suspicion. This phenomenon proved fatal to the Nigerias' first republic.

B. CONCLUSION

Judging by the high level of political instability and conflicts among ethnic groups Africa is faced with the problem of nation building. The search for strategies for ethnic integration is of utmost importance. As a result of military culture and patriotic values, which result in superior organization, scholars have proposed the military institution as a possible candidate for promoting national integration. The ability of the military to promote national integration is affected by the political elite, the state and society. Observations of countries that have used the military strategy have produced mixed results. However, it appears that militaries in more developed countries have been more successful than in developing countries.

This study therefore set out to test the hypothesis that modernized elite, states and societies do impact on the ability of militaries to function as instruments of national integration. What the study found was that on all three variables, the political elite, the state and the society, the South African military interacted with higher levels of development in 1992-1998, than did the Nigerian military between 1960-1966. Consequently, the South African military had more success in integrating itself and laying a foundation for national integration.

The theory established that African countries have no horizontal or vertical integration. It was also established that despite this fundamental weakness, African leaders continued to use instruments such as one-party regimes, state-sponsored cultural programs or monopoly of the mass media for dissemination of government propaganda in the name of nation building. Since politicians employ patronage or intimidation depending upon what they expect to succeed, nation building programs carried out in a political context, whether genuine or not, caused more divisions. This study has demonstrated that for this reason modernizing instruments employed by the central government fail to integrate the nation.

A national culture, which is the most necessary ingredient for national integration, cannot be dictated by the state. It must be allowed to evolve with the rise in the level of development. The effect of the level of development on national integration means that the central government should concentrate more on strategies for raising the level of socio-economic development. Instruments such as the military cannot function well if the variables they interact with are at a low level of development. The military may not

successfully carry out tasks assigned to it if, for example, the state is weak. The weakness of the state is the factor that directly caused the Nigerian military to fail in those crucial first six years.

In South Africa, the process of cultural adaptation that had occurred through socio-economic development played a role in successfully integrating its military and society in the first six years of majority rule. The process had started 300 years ago and developed as the European settlers spread their influence to the interior. One of the actions taken by settler regimes was to change the way of life of the indigenous population to make that way of life meet the requirements of capitalist development. National integration was never a part of a planned program, and apartheid actually discouraged it. Nevertheless, socio-economic development transformed the majority of the South African people and integrated them in a way that was even frustrating to the government, which wanted to see the ethnic groups separated as much as possible. The example of the South African case shows that if a socio-economic transformation is set in motion, ethnic cultures will adapt to the transformation whether the government likes it or not. The model of cultural adaptation should replace that of displacement, because instruments of displacement cause tensions between ethnic groups, and bring about the kind of instability that causes secessions.

The concrete lesson for African countries is that nation-building and social transformation go together. South African society was transformed by the unity of capitalist mining and aggressive commercialization of the land. It was transformed on the 'anvil of gold and the hammer' of maize, in the same way that German society was

transformed by "iron and rye," or by "rice and capital" in Japan. Oil would probably be transforming Nigeria today if it were not for the level of corruption. It is also possible that resources like Nigerian oil may prove a drawback to development and to national integration if the ethnic elite spend more time fighting over the distribution of revenues.

The link of national integration with overall socio-economic development does not mean that the military is therefore not important in nation building. The military instrument functions successfully within the context of overall socio-economic transformation. It has been established that at low levels of development the military is in effective as an instrument of integration. At high levels of development society is integrated and consequently the role of institutions for national integration must be weakened. It seems therefore that the military is in effective at both high and low levels of development. However, a closer look points to a different conclusion than this. The strategies of African countries used the state machinery in an attempt to displace existing ethnic cultures in pursuit of a national one. This created ethnic hostilities that spilled over into the military causing the military to fail as an instrument of national integration. A different strategy such as allowing ethnic cultures to adapt to evolving circumstances may have produced different results. At high level of development one sees the military utilizing developed conditions to integrate minorities and previously disadvantaged groups. Looked at this way, the military may be a champion of national integration at both a low level of national integration and at a high level. This lesson leads us to the possible courses of action that African countries may take to effect national integration.

- African countries should explore adaptive strategies of national integration because at low levels of development, ethnic cohesion is still strong and tensions can rise quickly over national decisions that are not made in a transparent manner. Tensions will be reduced if each ethnic group is allowed to control its own resources as much as possible so that it can appreciate the strength of unity. National integration should be bottom up and not top down.
- The tendency to over centralize political power under conditions of low level of development not only arrests that development, it also causes tensions because the centralized state will not efficiently allocate resources. Politicians will reward their clients and supporters. Over-centralization of political power in the African context of low level of development is the source of ethnic conflicts. The military is a direct victim of over-centralized power because the political elite will want to ensure the allegiance of the military in the exercise of authority.
- The development of patron-client relationships starts with the selection of representatives to the legislature, which is supposed to be the highest pillar in the accountability chain. Politicians go to the masses to patronize or to intimidate in order to obtain votes. Africans should revisit the franchise system so that the vote is somehow tied to responsibility. Surely no one expects a person who has no responsibility to demand accountability; however it is accountability that is required of African leadership. Accountability is linked to national integration since, as we have seen in this study, the political class is an important variable in that problem. If

the franchise goes to responsible people, then the politicians will be forced to be accountable on this issue of ethnic integration and to many other issues relating to governance.

- African countries should identify engines of social transformation and support them. Central to social transformation is the factor of a land-tenure regime that supports such social transformation. This means transforming the peasantry into wage earners on or off the land. A closer look, shows that the South Africa peasantry was transformed not much differently from that of the Japanese by the state supporting the forces of commercialization. Africans will have to find new ways of doing the same.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Books

- Adam, Heribert and Hermann Giliomee. *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.
- Ake, Claude. *A Theory of Political Integration*. Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1967.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins of Nations*. New York: Verso, 1996.
- Bayart, Jean-Francois. *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. New York: Longman, 1993.
- Berkett, Paul A. and Crawford Young, eds. *Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria*. Rochester, New York: University of Rochester, 1997.
- Cohen, Abner. *The Lesson of Ethnicity: Introduction in Urban Ethnicity*. London: Tavistock, 1974.
- Coleman, James. *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960.
- Cubitt, Gerald and Peter Joyce. *Journey Through South Africa*. Cape Town: Stuik Publishers, 1995.
- Deutsch, Karl and Wiliam Foltz, eds. *Nation Building*. New York: 1966.
- Diamond, Larry. *Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1988.
- Dietz, Henry., Elkin, Jerrold., Roumani, Maurice., *Ethnicity, Integration and the Military: IUS Special Editions on Armed Forces and Society, No3*. Oxford: Westview Press, 1991.
- Enloe, Cynthia. *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies*. Athens: University of Georgia press, 1980.
- Finer, Samuel. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1962.

- Gutteridge, William Frank. *The Military in South African Politics: Champions of National Unity?* United Kingdom: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1984.
- Horowitz, Donald. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
- Huntington, Samuel. *The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
- Janowitz, Morris. *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964.
- Johnson, Richard William and Lawrence Schlemmer. *Launching Democracy in South Africa: The First Open Election, April 1994*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996.
- Kennedy, Charles and David Louscher. *Civil-Military Interaction in Asia and Africa*. Leiden: E J Brill, 1990.
- Linz, Joan., Stepan, *The Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Luckham, Robin. *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt: 1960-1967*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
- Mackintosh, John. *Nigerian Government and Politics*. Evanston: North West University Press, 1966.
- Ogunade, Ernest. *Freedom of the Press: Government and Press Relationships in Nigeria*. Springfield: Illinois University Press, 1983.
- Osei-Kwame, Peter. *A New Conceptual Model for the Study of Political Integration in Africa*. Washington D.C: University Press of America, 1980.
- Seegers, Annette. *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996.
- Sklar, Richard. *Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Smith, Anthony D. *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing Inc., 1986.

Streamlau, John. *A House No Longer Divided: Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South Africa*. New York: Carnegie Commission, 1997.

The World Bank. *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1993.

Toit, Perre du. *State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa*. Washington: The U S Institute for Peace Press, 1965.

Uchendu, Victor. *The Passing of Tribal Man: A West African Experience in the Passing of Tribal Man in Africa*. Amsterdam: E J Brill, 1970.

Lexis/Nexis

Braid Mary, "Tutu Report, Legal Move Splits ANC," *The Independent*, 31 October 1998.
Available [Lexis/Nexis] 6 December 1998.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Decalo, Samuel. *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military and Business Leaders of Africa*. London: African Development Press, 1973.
- Dickie, John. *Who's Who in Africa: The Political, Military and Business Leaders of Africa*. London: African Development. 1973.
- Gutteridge, William Frank. *Military Regimes in Africa*. London: Methuen, 1975.
- Gutteridge, William Frank. *Military Institutions and Power in the New States*. New York: Praeger, 1965.
- Harbeson, John W. *The Military in African Politics*. New York: Praeger, 1987.
- Dietz, Henry, Jerrod Elkin, and Maurice Rommani. *Ethnicity, Integration and the Military*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
- Ikein, Augustine. *The Impact of Oil in a Developing Country: The Case of Nigeria*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990.
- Kirk-Greene, Antony. *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria 1967-1970: A Documentary Sourcebook 1996-1969*. London: African Studies Publishers, 1993.
- Kirk-Greene, Anthony. *State and Society in Francophone Africa Since Independence*. New York: Oxford, 1995.
- Marzkovits, Andrei S. and Frank E. Sysyn. *Nation Building and The Politics of Nationalism*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- Suryadinata, Leo. *Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 1989.
- Welch, Claude Emerson. *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
- Welch, Claude Emerson. *No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement From Politics In Africa and Latin America*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.

Welch, Claude Emerson Jr. and Meltzer, Ronald I. *Human Rights and Development in Africa*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984.

Yakubu, Alhaji M. *Rendezvous....: An Authorized Biography of Chief Justice Mohammed Bello*. London: African Affairs, 1997.

Zartman, Willam, ed. *The Political Economy of Nigeria*. New York: Praeger, 1983.

Journals

Agbese, Pita Ogaba. "The Military As an Obstacle to the Democratizaion Enterprise: Towards an Agenda For Permanent Military Disengagement from Politics in Nigeria," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 1-2, no. 8 (1996).

Bates, Robert. "Ethnicity in Contemporary Africa." *East African Studies Series* 14 (July 1973): 56.

Dekmejian, R. H. "Conflict and Harmony in Multi-ethnic Societies." *Choice* 8, no. 34 (1997): 1411-1412.

Copley Gregory R. " Learning to Live With Momentous Change." *Defence & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 6, no. 26 (1998): 3.

Gerhart, Gail M. " Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Decolonizing Egypt, Nigeria and Kenya, 1945-1963." *Foreign Affairs* 4, no. 77 (1998): 140.

Glickman, Harold. " Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria." *Choice* 7, no.35 (1998):1267.

Ihonvbere, Julius O. "Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of Democratization in Nigeria." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 2, no. 34 (1996): 193.

Joseph, Richard. "A Laurete's Lament." *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 8 (1997): 167-173.

Kwachuku, Levi A. "The United States and Nigeria-1960 to 1987: Anatomy of a Pragmatic Relationship." *Journal of Black Studies* 5, no. 28 (1998): 574-593.

Mabry, Marcus., Joshua Hammer, "Nigerian Roulette." *Newsweek* 25, no.131 (1998):38-40.

Mozaffar, Simon. "Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida." *Choice* 8, no. 35 (1998): 1448.

"More Military Management." *Crossborder Monitor* 6, no. 24 (1998) 6.

"Nigeria's Moment." *The Nation* 4, no. 267 (1998) 3-4.

Reynolds, Jonathan T. "The Politics of History: The Legacy of the Sokoto Califate in Nigeria." *Journal Of Asian and African Studies* 1, no 32. (1997) 50-60.

Smaldone, Joseph P. " The Nigerian Military and the State." *Journal of Military History* 2, no. 62 (1998) 456-457.

Saideman Stephen M. "Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability versus Ethnic ties" *International Organization* 4, no. 51 (1997) 721-753.

Wright, Stephen. "Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria." *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 4, no. 21 (1998).

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center2 8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 22060-6218	
2. Dudley Knox Library.....2 Naval Postgraduate School 411 Dyer Road Monterey, CA 93943-5101	
3. Professor Letitia Lawson.....1 Code NS/LL Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5101	
4. Mary Callahan.....1 Code NS/MC Naval Postgraduate Monterey, CA 93943-5101	
5. Thomas Bruneau.....1 Code NS/BN Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5101	
6. Center for Civil-Military Relations.....3 Code CM Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5101	
7. Dana Eyre.....1 Code NS/DE Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5101	

8. SATR Program Manager.....1
Navy International Programs Office
Crystal Gateway North, Room 701
Arlington, VA 22202-1000
9. Hoover Institute (Dept. of African Studies).....1
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-2044
10. Wing Commander Pax Nkomo.....1
55 Millais Road
Romney Park
Bulawayo
ZIMBABWE